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Articles
R.E. Hawkins* Reputational Review I:
Expertise, Bias and Delay
Expertise, bias and delay arguments are shifting the focus of judicial review from
the legality of administrative decisions to the reputation of administrative deci-
sion-makers. These grounds measure the skill, objectivity and efficiency charac-
teristics that define administrators' reputations. They make it possible for courts
to consider these reputations, even if only by way of unarticulated judicial notice,
when deciding judicial review applications. After setting out the theory of exper-
tise, bias and delay implicit in recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions, the
author concludes that courts must use less impressionistic measures in judging
these concepts, lawyers must present more concrete reputational evidence in
arguing them, and administrators must become more sensitive to their impact on
public opinion.
Des arguments de competence, de prejug6 et de delai sont en train de modifier
I'approche traditionnelle a la revision judiciaire, de la legalite des decisions
administratives a la reputation des d6cideurs administratifs. Ces facteurs
mesurent les traits caract6ristiques de I'habilit, de l'objectivite et de I'efficience
quiprecisent tous la r6putation des administrateurs. Ils permettent aux tribunaux
de r6flechir 6 ces r6putations, meme si ce n'est que par moyen d'avertissement
judiciaire non articule, lorsqu'on decide des applications de revision judiciaire.
Apres avoir 6tabli la theorie de comp6tence, de pr6jug6 et de delai implicite dans
les decisions recentes de la Cour supreme du Canada, I'auteur ne peut que
conclure d'abord que les tribunaux utilisent des d6marches qui sont moins
subjectives Iorsqu'on juge ces concepts, ensuite que les avocats doivent pr6senter
des preuves concretes relatives a la reputation du decideur en question et
finalement, que les administrateurs doivent s'efforcer a etre plus sensible par
rapport a I'influence qu'ils ont sur I'opinion publique.
* Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario. I would like to thank David Shoemaker,
Jason Kroft, Michael McConnell and Christine Tabbert who provided research assistance and
Frances Andrews, William Bargeman and Nancy Hawkins who provided support services. A
companion article, "Reputational Review II: Administrative Agencies, Print Media and
Content Analysis," forthcoming in the Canadian Journal ofAdministrative Law and Practice,
builds on the theoretical framework set out in this article by exploring the reputations of three
large administrative agencies in the press.
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Introduction
Judicial deference is not the dominant administrative law ideology it was
a decade ago.' The CUPE2 "patently unreasonable" standard of review
must now compete with the Bibeault3 "correctness" standard. A judge,
depending on his or her inclination in a particular case, can either be
cautious not "to brand as jurisdictional ... that which may be doubtfully
so, or aggressive in asserting the "renewed emphasis on the superin-
tending and reforming function of the superior Courts."5 The Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms [hereinafter Charter] has accustomed
courts to making policy interventions of a kind once thought to be the
preserve of the legislative and executive branches. Fewer governmental
resources and a laissez-faire ideological climate have conditioned the
public to smaller bureaucracies and a measure of deregulation. In this
anti-bureaucratic environment, less curial deference to administrators
hardly seems politically incorrect.
This article takes a different tack. It posits that what has changed is not
so much the intensity but the focus of judicial review. The older sort of
review, conducted on grounds ofjurisdiction, error of law, and procedure,
focused on the legality of the decision. The newer sort, conducted on
grounds of expertise, bias, and delay, focuses on the reputation of the
decision-maker.
It is not strictly correct to think of expertise, bias, and delay as new
grounds. Rather, reputational review is a regrouping of different aspects
of the original jurisdictional and procedural grounds. In the past, exper-
tise has been considered under the rubric of jurisdiction; bias and delay
as part of natural justice. It is clear, however, that expertise is not
1. See for example, Canada (Attorney-General) v. Mossop, [ 1993] 1 S .C.R. 554, 100 D.L.R.
(4th) 658 [hereinafter Mossop cited to D.L.R.] and Gould v. Yukon Order of Pioneers, [ 1996]
1 S.C.R. 571, 133 D.L.R. (4th) 449 [hereinafter Gould cited to D.L.R.]. This is not to say that
the trend is entirely against deference: see for example Pezim v. British Columbia (Superin-
tendent of Brokers), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557, 114 D.L.R. (4th) 385 [hereinafter Pezim cited to
D.L.R.]; Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Canada (Labour Relations Board), [ 1995] 1 S.C.R.
157, 121 D.L.R. (4th) 385 [hereinafter Goldhawk cited to D.L.R.]; and Director of Investiga-
tion and Research v. Southam Inc. et al., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748, 144 D.L.R. (4th) 1. Rather, it
is the inconsistency in the Court's approach that creates the impression that the Court is more
activist.
2. C.U.P.E., Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp., [1979] 2 S .C.R. 227,97 D.L.R. (3d)
417, Dickson J. [hereinafter CUPE cited to D.L.R.].
3. Syndicat national des employes de la commission scolaire rigionale de l'Outaouais v.
U-E S., local 298, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048, 35 Admin. L.R. 153 (sub nom. U.E.S., local 298 v.
Bibeault) [hereinafter Bibeault cited to Admin. L.R.].
4. CUPE, supra note 2 at 422.
5. Bibeault, supra note 3 at 195.
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jurisdictional in the same sense as is statutory interpretation. Nor are bias
and delay procedural in the same sense as is the right to cross-examine.
Moreover, increasing emphasis is being placed on expertise, bias and
delay to the point where it may be time to break them out of the traditional
three grounds and classify them in their own right .6
Review on grounds of expertise,bias and delay links agency reputation
to judicial deference in two ways. First, expertise, bias, and delay are
nebulous, relative concepts that put agency character traits in issue.
Expertise is a test of skill: "Who has the best qualifications to do this job?"
Bias is a test of impartiality: "Who has the appropriate degree of open-
mindedness for this job?" Delay is a test of efficiency: "Who has the best
management ability to get this job done?" The legislature intended that
final decisions would be left to administrators where their skill, motive
and efficiency better suited them than judges to the task.7
Second, one purpose of judicial review is to maintain public confi-
dence in administrative decision-makers. Reputation is a measure of that
confidence. Thus, expertise is about maintaining confidence in the skill
of administrators who discharge public responsibilities; reputation is a
factor in determining whether a tribunal is "expert." Impartiality is about
maintaining confidence in the disinterestedness of administrative deci-
sion-makers; reputation is a factor in determining whether there exists a
"reasonable apprehension of bias." Delay is about maintaining public
confidence in the management of agency justice; reputation is a factor in
determining what length of delay causes "prejudice." For example, a
securities commission that enjoys a public reputation for regulating in an
efficient, even-handed and timely manner may find that courts show
deference to its decisions.
This process has a compounding effect. A court examines an agency's
existing public reputation. It reaches conclusions that further shape the
agency's image in the eyes of the regulated community and the broader
public. It writes reasons that affect the agency's reputation in the eyes of
other judges and lawyers. The degree of judicial deference accorded an
agency on grounds of expertise, bias, and delay will not only be influ-
enced by, but will influence, an agency's reputation for skill, impartiality
and efficiency.
Two questions need to be answered. First, what reputation is the
relevant reputation for judicial review? Is it an agency's reputation with
6. The Dominion Law Reports, under the heads in its administrative law index, has already
done this. It is interesting to note the exponential increase in the number of cases recorded under
these heads in the index of those Reports, particularly with respect to bias.
7. See Bibeault, supra note 3 at 193 and 195.
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the general public, with the constituencies that it serves or regulates, with
the legal community appearing before it, or with the interest and lobby
groups working in its area? This article will show that in theory any
reputational image could, through the aegis of expertise, bias and delay,
have an impact on judicial deference. The more broadly based the
reputation, the more likely it will provide an objective view of the
agency's character and a more accurate read of public confidence in the
agency's work. In any particular situation, empirical research is needed
to demonstrate which reputations, associated with which agencies, will
matter to which courts.'
The second question is related. How do judges determine, or become
aware of agency reputations? Do they operate in an ad hoc way on the
basis of personal hunch, or preference, or do they take unspoken, and
perhaps unconscious,judicial notice of unidentified reputational sources?
Reputational facts are not the subject of evidentiary submission, submis-
sions which would in any event be difficult to develop given the nature
of judicial review proceedings. It is doubtful that agency reputation is
raised in legal argument before the court, and reasons for decision do not
expressly mention it. Indeed, as will be discussed below, reasons for
decision on judicial review tend to treat expertise, bias and delay in an
assertive fashion with little evidence, reputational or otherwise, mar-
shalled in support of conclusions. Elsewhere, I propose to argue that the
judges sitting on the judicial review applications involving the three
agencies studied likely were familiar with the press images of the
agencies that shaped their public reputation. The images were pervasive
and notorious. The press sources were selected for study because of the
probability that they counted the judiciary amongst their readership. It
will be incumbent on empirical researchers studying particular situations
to show not only which agency reputation is relevant to a particular court,
but also to demonstrate how that reputation enters the judicial conscious-
ness.
The identification of a possible link between reputation and deference
underlines the need for clearer thinking on the real influences that affect
judicial review. What are the criteria for measuring expertise? What
kinds of partisan activities and associations constitute bias? How much
time makes delay prejudicial? Identification of the link also has conse-
quences for those involved in judicial review. If reputation is potentially
8. See R.E. Hawkins & D.M. Shoemaker,"Reputational Review II: Administrative Agencies,
Print Media and Content Analysis" forthcoming CJ.A.L.P. This article suggests that for the
three agencies studied the reputation that matters on judicial review is their general public
reputation as shaped by several wide circulation press sources of varied editorial viewpoint.
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influential, judges are under an obligation to treat it in their reasons
expressly rather than considering it surreptitiously. Lawyers are under an
obligation to file reputational evidence relating to the skill, impartiality
and efficiency of agencies. Administrators can be expected to take care
that the way in which they exercise their mandate does not alienate public
opinion. Whether by greater transparency, accountability, polling, or
better public relations, administrative agencies will want to tend to their
reputations.
I. Expertise
Courts defer to tribunal expertise.' A specialist tribunal is entitled to
deference in its interpretation of law within its expertise and, in particular,
in its interpretation of its home statute. 0 A non-specialist tribunal is
entitled to deference only in its findings of fact, the same deference that
is accorded to all triers of fact who have had the "signal advantage" of
seeing and hearing witnesses."' In CUPE, expertise provided a reason for
restraint; 2 in Bibeaut, lack of expertise provided a justification for
intervention. 3
Other factors, apart from expertise, affect the intensity of judicial
review. These include legislative intent as to who should have the final
say on the matters in issue, 4 the practical need for speedy and efficient
9. See CJ.A., Local 579 v. Bradco Construction Ltd., [1993] 2 S.C.R. 316,102 D.L.R. (4th)
402 at 412 [hereinafter Bradco cited to D.L.R.] where Justice Sopinka stated that "the court
must determine what the legislator intended should be the standard of review applied to the
particular decision at issue, having due regard for the policy enunciated by this court that, in
the case of specialized tribunals, decisions upon matters entrusted to them by reason of their
expertise should be accorded deference."
10. See Mossop, supra note 1, especially Lamer, J. for the majority; and Gould, supra note 1.
11. See Mossop, ibid., especially L'Heureux-Dub6 in dissent; Zurich Insurance Co. v.
Ontario (Human Rights Commission), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 321, 93 D.L.R. (4th) 346 at 373
[hereinafter Zurich cited to D.L.R.], L'Heureux-Dub6 in dissent; Gould, ibid.; and Dickason
v. Governors of the University of Alberta, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 1103, 95 D.L.R. (4th) 439 at 450
[hereinafter Dickason cited to D.L.R.].
12. See supra note 2 at 424, where the court observed that, "The rationale for the protection
of a labour board's decisions within jurisdiction is straightforward and compelling. The labour
board is a specialized tribunal which administers a comprehensive statute regulating labour
relations."
13. See supra note 3 at 194, where Justice Beetz observed that, "At this stage, the Court
examines not only the wording of the enactment conferring jurisdiction on the administrative
tribunal, but the purpose of the statute creating the tribunal,the reason for its existence, the area
of expertise of its members and the nature of the problem before the tribunal."
14. Ibid. at 195: "[Tlhe true problem of judicial review is to discover whether the legislator
intended the tribunal's decision on these matters to be binding on the parties to the dispute ....
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administration in high-volume areas,"5 the need to preserve the coherence
of an agency's jurisprudence, and the "integrity of certain administrative
processes."' 6 In the final analysis, however, these factors are, as Justice
La Forest observed, "so intertwined as to be most conveniently consid-
ered in one analysis." 7 They form a "melange" which has, at its base, the
level of expertise of the administrative decision-maker. 8
The rationale behind the court's deference to administrative expertise
is, in Justice Wilson's words, "grounded ... on good common sense." 19
When a legislature entrusts a job to an expert tribunal, the legislature is,
for reasons of efficiency, relying on that expertise to give effect to
legislative policy. 0 The court defers when the legislature establishes a
tribunal that "by virtue of its specialized expertise . . . is uniquely suited"
to do the job.2' The issue before the court, therefore, is how to identify
which administrators should be qualified as expert.
The theory of expertise used by the court to do this is the same as that
used by the court to qualify expert witnesses. In the latter case, the court
identifies the witness's expertise, defines the issue and asks whether the
expertise is relevant to the issue. In the former case, the court identifies
the tribunal's expertise by describing the "role of the tribunal." It then
defines the issue by analyzing the "nature of the question."22 Finally, it
considers the relevance of the expertise by asking whether the nature of
the question falls within the role of the tribunal. It is easy to turn the "role
of the tribunal," "the nature of the question," and the description of the
proximity between the two, into labels that hide the real reasons why the
15. See Telecommunication Worker's Union v. British Columbia Telephone Co., [1988] 2
S.C.R. 564, 54 D.L.R. (4th) 385 at 399 [hereinafter B.C. Tel. cited to D.L.R.] where Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6 identified "efficiency" as the reason for deferring to labour tribunals and
arbitrators. See also Consolidated Bathurst Packaging Ltd. v. 1.WA., Local 269, [1990] 1
S.C.R. 282,68 D.L.R. (4th) 524 [hereinafter Consolidated Bathurst cited to D.L.R.]; Tremblay
v. Quebec (Commission Des Affaires Sociales), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 952, 90 D.L.R. (4th) 609
[hereinafter Tremblay cited to D.L.R.1; Canada (Attorney-General) v. Public Service Alliance
of Canada, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 941, 101 D.L.R. (4th) 673 at 683 [hereinafter PSAC #2 cited to
D.L.R.].
16. Consolidated Bathurst, ibid.; Tremblay, ibid.; Mossop, supra note 1 at 686.
17. Dayco (Canada) Ltd. v. CA.W.-Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 230,102 D.L.R. (4th) 609 at
631 [hereinafter Dayco cited to D.L.R.].
18. Ibid. at 631-2.
19. W.W. Lester (1978) Ltd. v. U.A., Local 740, [1990] 3. S.C.R. 644,76 D.L.R. (4th) 389 at
392 [hereinafter W.W. Lester cited to D.L.R.].
20. Gould, supra note I at 490-1.
21. Goldhawk, supra note 1 at 401. See also Bradco, supra note 9 at 412.
22. In Bradco , ibid., Justice Sopinka stated at 412 that "The legislative provisions in question
must be interpreted in light of the particular tribunal and the type of questions which are
entrusted to it."
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court decides that the tribunal is, or is not, expert. This tendency to label
will be considered by examining each of the above three steps in the
theory of expertise.
The first step is to determine the "role of the tribunal." This is done by
interpreting the tribunal's enabling legislation. The court assumes that the
more specialized the task assigned to the tribunal, the more expert the
tribunal. In Dayco, Justice LaForest states this expressly: "In my view,
the relative expertise of board members and arbitrators must be presumed
to be commensurate with the scope of the divergent statutory man-
dates."23 Role determines expertise: experts are people who perform
specialized roles.
This can be illustrated with two examples. In Gould, Justice L' Heureux-
Dub6 deduced that a human rights tribunal was expert from the role
assigned to it by its enabling legislation:
I observe that human rights legislation has, as one of its main purposes, the
creation of a comprehensive scheme for the enforcement of human rights:
... In order to carry out this purpose, the Act establishes a specialist
tribunal .... 24
Similarly, in Pezim, Justice Iacobucci relied on the empowering statute
to "prove" the expertise of the B.C. Securities Commission:
The breadth of the Commission's expertise and specialization is reflected
in the provisions of the Securities Act. Section 4 of the Act identifies the
Commission as being responsible for the administration of the Act. The
Commission also has broad powers with respect to investigations, audits,
hearings, and orders. Section 144.2 provides that any decision of the
Commission filed in the registry of the Supreme Court of British Columbia
has the force and effect of a decision of that court. Finally, pursuant to s. 153
of the Act, the Commission has the power to revoke or vary any of its
decisions. Sections 14 and 144 are of particular importance as they reveal
the breadth of the Commission's public interest mandate.2 1
23. Supra note 17 at 632.
24. Supra note 1 at 492-3.
25. Supra note I at 407-8. Other cases that rely heavily on a statutory analysis of the tribunal's
role and powers to deduce expertise include British Columbia Telephone Co. v. Shaw Cable
Systems (B.C.) Ltd. [1995] 2 S.C.R. 739, 125 D.L.R. (4th) 443 [hereinafter Shaw cited to
D.L.R.]; Goldhawk, supra note 1; Domtar Inc. v. Quebec (Commission d'appel en matiere de
lesions professionnelles), [ 1993] 2 S .C.R. 756, 105 D.L.R. (4th) 385 [hereinafter Domtar cited
to D.L.R.]; Mossop, supra note 1; and Canada (Attorney-General) v. Public Service Alliance
of Canada, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 614, 80 D.L.R. (4th) 520 [hereinafter PSAC #1 cited to D.L.R.I.
For examples where statutory analysis of role and powers lead to the conclusion that the
tribunals in question were "non-specialist" see Dickason, supra note 1I, and Zurich, supra
note I1.
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In order to determine which roles are specialized, the court considers
whether the agency's work includes a complex and technical dimension,
as in telecommunications or energy regulation, 6 a broad policy dimen-
sion, as in securities regulation,27 or an obligation to oversee and develop
a statutory regime, as in the regulation of labour relations.28 The court
also considers whether the task assigned to the tribunal is limited to
regulating the affairs of the parties before it or whether it also includes
developing policies that have a more general public impact.2 9 People
assigned complex tasks having broad impact are considered expert.
The court's use of role as the primary determinant of expertise does not
go far enough for three reasons. First, the line between specialist and non-
specialist roles, between tasks that the legislature wanted done by trained
experts using specialized knowledge, and those that it preferred be left to
ordinary citizens relying on community values," is not always evident.
There is no question that it takes an expert tribunal to license the operation
of a nuclear reactor; it is not so clear that a specialist is required to
recognize discrimination.
Second, the definition of tribunal expertise risks becoming tautologi-
cal if it is limited to the nature of the tribunal's role. In Bradco, Justice
Sopinka considered the matter from the opposite point of view. Instead
of defining expertise by reference to role, he defined the tribunal's role
by reference to its expertise.3 However, if role determines expertise and
expertise defines role - if a specialized task is work done by an expert and
an expert is someone who does a specialized task - the reasoning is
circular. The solution is to break the circularity by broadening the inquiry
to include other factors in determining expertise.
Third, while it is not unreasonable to assume that the legislature
intended specialized tasks to be performed by expert tribunals, whether
the tribunal performing the task is expert or not is an empirical matter.
Legislatures do not usually write job descriptions for tribunal members,
or define in detail how they are to be chosen, or choose them, or train
them, or require them to collect precedents, or evaluate their perfor-
26. See British Columbia (Milk Board) v. Grisnich, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 895, 126 D.L.R. (4th)
191 at 199 [hereinafter Grisnich cited to D.L.R.I. See also Shaw, ibid.
27. See Pezim, supra note I at 409-10. See also Dayco, supra note 17.
28. See Dayco, supra note 17 and PSAC #1, supra note 25.
29. See Pezim, supra note 1; Mossop, supra note 1; and Dayco, supra note 17.
30. In other words, what a jury is to civil and criminal law.
31. Supra note 9 at 414 where Justice Sopinka stated that "the expertise of the tribunal is of
the utmost importance in determining the intention of the legislator with respect to the degree
of deference to be shown to a tribunal's decision in the absence of a full privative clause."
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mance.32 Too heavy a reliance on deductions from statutory analysis,
something that judges do well naturally, and an insufficient reliance on
actual evidence, an area where judges are at the mercy of lawyers33 , will
result in the court deferring to de jure as opposed to de facto expertise.
Legislation may envisage that a specialized tribunal will be established;
the reality may be something else. The operative assumption must be that
a legislature with a specialized task to be performed only intends
deference to a tribunal with actual expertise: only that kind of proven
expertise can efficiently give effect to legislative policy. This means that
the court, in identifying expertise, must broaden the inquiry beyond
statutory analysis.
In principle, the court acknowledges this. 34 In practice, however, its
conclusions tend to be unsupported by evidence." A broader inquiry into
expertise would consider evidence in five categories. First, evidence of
the method of tribunal appointments is relevant. How are appointments
made? Are they open and advertised, or made in secret? By whom are they
made? Is there a detailed job description? Does security of tenure exist,
or are the appointments at pleasure? Are appointments staggered to
preserve a reservoir of expertise? Justice Cory cited some evidence of
thiskind in relation to the Public Service Staff Relations Board:
There are a number of reasons why the decisions of the Board made within
its jurisdiction should be treated with deference ... [R]ecognition must be
given to the fact that the Board is composed of both labour and manage-
ment. They are aware of the intricacy of labour relations and the delicate
balance that must be preserved between the parties for the benefit of
society. These experts will often have earned by their merit the confidence
of the parties .... 36
32. There are some exceptions. The Commission d'appel en matibre de 16sions professionnelles
[CALP] has an obligation under s.391 of the Act respecting Industrial Accidents and
Occupational Diseases, R.S.Q., c. A-3.001 to publish its own decisions; see also Domtar,
supra note 25 at 398.
33. Lawyers rarely present evidence on these matters to court, in part because it has never
been done, but also because judicial review and appeal procedures are not conducive to
developing and testing evidence.
34. See, for example, the call of the reviewing court to consider a wide number of indicia in
Goldhawk, supra note I at 420 and Mossop, supra note I at 690. The difficulty is that evidence
is rarely called and no facts are proven that would indicate these functional considerations are
actually being considered.
35. See e.g. supra note I and supra note 25.
36. PSAC#2,supra note 15 at 689. Compare this statement with the following bald statement
in Grisnich, supra note 26 at 199 on the appointment of Milk Board members: "Their members
are specifically chosen because they possess expertise in this area, not because they are familiar
with jurisdictional issues."
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Second, evidence of the credentials -training and experience prior to
appointment- is essential for judging expertise. Aside from a reference
to the "special skills" of members of the Public Service Staff Relations
Board, "who are experienced and knowledgeable in the field of labour
relations generally and particularly as [to] labour relations issues existing
between the Public Service and the Federal Government,"37 and a
reference to members of the Canadian Import Tribunal as, "experts
familiar with the intricacies of international trade relations,"38 the Su-
preme Court of Canada cases since 1979 reviewed for this article simply
assume that board members possess the appropriate job credentials
without specifying exactly what those credentials are or requiring proof
of them.
Third, evidence of the accumulated "on-the-job" experience at the
tribunal should be taken into account in assessing expertise. Do members
sit on hearings on an "ad hoc" or an "ongoing" basis?3 9 When sitting, do
they have a meaningful opportunity to participate in decision-making? 4
Do they have other regular involvement, such as through mediation or
education activities, with the regulated community? In her dissent in
Mossop,4" Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 discussed the expertise gained in
dealing with particular issues and communities as "field sensitivity":4 2
A related consideration is the connection of the board to the context. That
is, even a body made up of "non-specialists" may develop a certain "field-
sensitivity" where that body is in a position of proximity to the community
and its needs. Where the question is one that requires a familiarity with and
understanding of the context, there is a stronger argument that a higher
degree of deference may be appropriate.
37. PSAC #1, supra note 25 at 552.
38. National Corn Growers Assn. v. Canada (Canadian Import Tribunal), [1993] 2 S.C.R.
1324, 74 D.L.R. (4th) 449 at 465 [hereinafter Corn Growers cited to D.L.R.].
39. In Bradco, supra note 9 at 416 and in Shaw,supra note 25 at 452, labour arbitration boards
were held to be ad hoc panels when compared with the ongoing work of members of labour
relations boards or boards like the Canadian Radio-Television & Telecommunications
Commission. In Mossop, supra note 1,the same distinction was made when comparing human
rights tribunals and the Human Rights Commission. The validity of this distinction is discussed
below.
40. For example, what is the role of sidespeople? Who chairs the decision-making confer-
ences? Who writes the decisions? Are there wider consultation procedures such as full board
procedures? See Consolidated Bathurst, supra note 15; R.E. Hawkins,"Behind Closed Doors
I: The Substantive Problem - Full Boards, Consensus Tables and Caucus Cabals" (1996) 9
CJ.A.L.P. 267.
41. Supra note I at 693. Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 held that the Canadian Human Rights
Commission,"would inevitably accumulate expertise and specialized understanding of human
rights issues, as well as a body of governing jurisprudence." This conclusion, while correct,
would be stronger if some evidence was presented to support it.
42. Ibid. at 685.
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Fourth, evidence of the institutional support available to tribunal
members is important for determining expertise. Is the tribunal guided by
an explicit set of objectives ,41 or by an analytic and workable framework
for applying its statute?" Does it have a developed and published body
of jurisprudence?45 Is the tribunal organized in such a way that members'
duties and responsibilities are clearly understood? Are there organiza-
tional charts and job descriptions? Are tribunal operating rules known
and applied in a professional manner? Do tribunal members receive
training, and of what kind, prior to beginning their job and on an ongoing
and systematic basis? Are institutional manuals, both procedural and
substantive, available? Are library facilities and research support given
any priority? Are a sufficient number of professional and other staff
available to support the work of the tribunal? Many of these factors are
never overtly mentioned by the court in examining expertise, let alone
proven.
Fifth, evidence of evaluation methods and promotion policies pro-
vides a peer-group measure of expertise. Are there regular performance
evaluation for tribunal members?4 6 Is there appropriate progress through
the ranks, for example to vice-chair and chair positions? What is the
tribunal's judicial review record?
Too heavy a reliance on statutory deductions relating to the role of the
tribunal, coupled with too narrow an inquiry into actual expertise, have
made the classification of tribunals by degree of specialization highly
subjective. A hierarchy has developed.47 Labour, telecommunications
and securities commissions, are considered most specialized. Courts are
prepared to defer to these bodies so long as the laws that they interpret are
within their area of expertise and their interpretations are not patently
unreasonable. Labour arbitrators are considered less specialized but are
shown deference in the interpretation of collective agreements. Human
rights boards of inquiry are considered non-specialist and are only
accorded deference on their findings of fact.
43. B.C. Tel., supra note 15 at400.
44. Goldhawk, supra note I at 398 and 400; Dayco, supra note 17 at 632.
45. Goldhawk, ibid. at 401; Domtar, supra note 25 at 398; Mossop, supra note I at 686;
CUPE, supra note 2 at 424.
46. Not, of course, an evaluation of decisions in order to enforce 'the party line' or to
discourage dissent, but rather evaluation of work habits and quality of work, much as a
university professor is evaluated.
47. See the comments of Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 in Mossop, supra note I at 683: "On the
other hand, there is a great variety and diversity among administrative bodies and not all
administrative bodies are specialized or have equal expertise."
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However, individual judges disagree on these expertise rankings. In
Dayco, a labour arbitrator had to decide whether benefits paid to retirees
survived the expiry of the collective agreement. The court held that the
standard of review, correctness, had been met. Justice La Forest, writing
for the majority, made the following comment:
An arbitrator's expertise is in a limited sense related to labour relations
policy, but it must be conceded that it falls short of the wide-ranging
policy-making function sometimes delegated to labour boards.... In short,
an arbitration board falls towards the lower end of the spectrum of those
administrative tribunals charged with policy deliberations to which the
courts should defer. Similarly, tribunals vested with the responsibility to
oversee and develop a statutory regime are more likely to be entitled to
judicial deference."a
Justice Sopinka, in Bradco49 , a case decided two weeks after Dayco,
expanded on Justice La Forest's comment:
... a distinction can be drawn between arbitrators, appointed on an ad hoc
basis to decide a particular dispute arising under a collective agreement,
and labour relations boards responsible for overseeing the ongoing inter-
pretation of legislation and development of labour relations policy and
precedent within a given labourjurisdiction. To the latter, and other similar
specialized tribunals responsible for the regulation of a specific industrial
or technological sphere, a greater degree of deference is due their interpre-
tation of the law notwithstanding the absence of a privative clause.
In his dissent in Dayco, Justice Cory did not accept that an arbitrator was
less specialized in dealing with labour relations matters, and so entitled
to less deference, than a labour board. He stated:50
It is particularly appropriate that this high standard of deference should be
applied to administrative decisions made in the field of labour relations,
whether they be made by tribunals, boards or arbitrators. In this volatile
and sensitive field, the decision of either an arbitrator selected by the
parties or of a labour board, which is often composed of representatives of
both labour and management with wide experience in the field, should be
final and binding unless the decision is indeed patently unreasonable.
Arbitrators are appointed on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis while board
members enjoy an ongoing appointment. But this fact must be measured
against other evidence. Arbitrators are usually professionals with exten-
sive training, experience, or both. An arbitrator with long service in a
particular industrial sector will have a better understanding of the impact
48. Supra note 17 at 631-2.
49. Supra note 9 at 416. The court deferred to an arbitrator's interpretation of a collective
agreement.
50. Supra note 17 at 664.
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of labour law provisions on labour-management relations in that sector
than board members. An examination of actual evidence of expertise
might have avoided the divergence in ranking expertise in the above two
cases.
The categorization of human rights boards of inquiry is open to the
same criticism. In Mossop, Justice La Forest noted that these boards, like
labour arbitrators, were ad hoc bodies. Although he was prepared to defer
to the latter's interpretation of a collective agreement, he was not
prepared to defer to the former's interpretation of human rights legisla-
tion. He reasoned as follows:
A labour arbitrator operates, under legislation, in a narrowly restricted
field, and is selected by the parties to arbitrate a difference between them
under a collective agreement the parties have voluntarily entered ... This
is entirely different from the situation of a human rights tribunal, whose
decision is imposed on the parties and has a direct influence on society at
large in relation to basic social values.5
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6, dissenting, saw things differently. Although
she acknowledged that human rights boards of inquiry were, "not as
'specialized' as some other administrative bodies such as labour boards,"52
she held that such boards were specialists and should be accorded
deference when interpreting their "home statutes."53 She extended her
conclusion to human rights commissions as well:
As for the Commission itself, Parliament unquestionably intended to
create a highly specialized administrative body, one with sufficient exper-
tise to review Acts of Parliament and, as specifically provided for in the
Act, to offer advice and make recommendations to the Minister of Justice.
In the exercise of its powers and functions, the Commission would
inevitably accumulate expertise and specialized understanding of human
rights issues, as well as a body of governing jurisprudence. The work of the
Commission and its tribunals involves the consideration and balancing of
a variety of social needs and goals, and requires sensitivity, understanding
and expertise.5 4
There is a lack of consistency in all of this. If ad hoc labour arbitrators
are sufficiently expert to be shown deference in their interpretation of
51. Supra note I at 675.
52. Dickason, supra note 11 at 450.
53. Mossop, supra note 1 at 693-4 and Gould, supra note I at 493. The Justice has made it
clear that she is not about to defer to the majority on this point despite a pointed remark by the
Chief Justice in Mossop about her dissent. In a recent speech she stated the following:
"Although I have not yet succeeded in persuading my colleagues that the expertise of human
rights tribunals can also extend to the interpretation of their statute...". [See The Honourable
Madam Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dub6, "Volatile Times: Balancing Human Rights, Respon-
sibilities and Resources" (Address to the CASHRA Human Rights Conference, 3 June 1996)].
54. Mossop, ibid. at 675.
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collective agreements, why are not ad hoc boards of inquiry sufficiently
expert in their interpretation of human rights legislation? It may be a
question of the breadth of the impact of their decisions, those of the labour
arbitrator being limited to the parties before them, those of the boards of
inquiry having a "direct influence on society at large in relation to basic
social values. 55 However, other agencies such as labour boards and
securities commissions make decisions with broad social impact and they
are shown deference. It may be that labour board and securities commis-
sion decisions are considered technical and complex. If that is the criteria,
then evidence beyond the fact that human rights commissioners "would
inevitably accumulate expertise ...as well as a body of governing
jurisprudence" will be necessary to convince a court of the existence of
specialization in human rights matters .56 If confusion is to be avoided,
more hard evidence is needed that the people performing these roles are
actually expert.
There may be good reasons for deferring to labour boards but not to
human rights commissions. Those reasons, however, will not be made
clear by an inquiry into expertise that is limited and impressionistic. The
"role of tribunal" approach has resulted in inconsistency in the way that
the same judges treat different tribunals and different judges treat the
same tribunal. It does not help predict in advance which tribunals will be
considered specialist, and accorded deference, and which will not. In
order to test de facto institutional competence in a less impressionistic
way, the court must broaden its inquiry to examine expertise across a full
range of indicators.
In deciding whether or not to show deference, it is not enough for the
court to conclude that the person performing the role is expert. It must also
conclude that the role requires expertise to be performed. The second step
in the court's theory of expertise aims to achieve this by examining "the
nature of the question." It requires that the issue before the tribunal be
examined. The court determines the nature of the question by selecting a
label from one of eleven categories ranging across the law/fact di-
chotomy .7 Five of those categories tend to be fact oriented -fact, agreed
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Although the court has not collectively referred to all of these categories in any one case,
each category is specifically referred to as a central factor in determining the nature of the
question in the various cases cited below.
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fact,58 social fact,5 9 viva voce evidence,6° no evidence, 6' and inference
from fact. 62 Four are more legally oriented: eneral questions of law, 63
policy,64 technical matters, 65 and matters of general public importance
66
(or, matters with far-reaching consequences). 67 One, application of law
to fact,68 is a hybrid and one, factual and legal elements inseparable 
69
questions the utility of the exercise.
This is pure labelling, entirely result-driven. Judges disagree on "the
nature of the question" and case outcomes are irreconcilable. This has
gone on for a long time.7 It happens because, as Justice L' Heureux-Dub6
observed, the fact/law distinction, "is not always clear,"'" factual and
legal elements sometime being "inseparable."72 The distinction between
law and fact is difficult to sustain. Professor Cory recognized this in 1936:
It has been stated that these two steps [determine the facts/ apply the
statute] are separate and distinct; that the well-drawn statutes have a single
literal or contextual meaning which can be discovered in advance of
applying the statute, and that, once that has been determined, the question
whether a particular set of facts is within that meaning is not of interpre-
tation at all but a question of application. If words have single, definite
meanings, this separation is possible in theory. But no judge ever begins
the process of judging until he knows the facts upon which he is to decide.
Then he begins at once to think of the statute in relation to those facts and
they inevitably colour his interpretation. If he says the meaning of the
statute is clear, it is because it speaks plainly about his facts. In considering
58. Gould, supra note I at 455,492, and 494; Ross v.New Brunswick SchoolDistrict No. 15,
[1996] 1 S.C.R., 133 D.L.R. (4th) 1 at 14 [hereinafter Ross cited to D.L.R.]; University of
British Columbia v. Berg, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 353, 102 D.L.R. (4th) 665 at 677 (2d) 141
[hereinafter Berg cited to D.L.R.]; Dickason, supra note II at 449; Surich, supra note 11 at 365.
59. Gould, ibid. at 456 and at 493, the latter citing Dickason, supra note 11 at 451-2.
60. Dickason, ibid.
61. W.W. Lester, supra note 19 at 423.
62. Gould,supra note 1 at455-6; Ross,supra note 58 at 14-15; Zurich,supra note I I at 372-3.
63. Gould, ibid. at 455 and 491; Goldhawk, supra note I at 402; Berg, supra note 58 at 677;
Dickason, supra note 11 at 494; Bibeault, supra note 3 at 202; Syndicat des employes de
production du Quebec et de l'Acadie v. Canada (Labour Relations Board), [1984] 2 S.C.R.
412, 14 D.L.R. (4th) 457 at 465.
64. Gould, ibid. at 492-4; Dickason, ibid. at 451.
65. Gould, ibid. at 491.
66. Goldhawk, supra note 1 at 429.
67. Ibid.
68. Gould, supra note I at 491-2.
69. Ibid.
70. This is the same as the "yes/no" kind of reasoning adopted in the "high-mark ofjudicial
intervention" case,Bell v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), [ 197 11 S .C.R. 756, 18 D.L.R.
(3d) 1, effectively criticized by Paul Weiler, In The Last Resort: A Critical Study of The
Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Carswell/Methuen, 1974) at 139-54.
71. Mossop, supra note I at 686.
72. Gould, supra note I at 494.
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his decision, he goes back and forth from facts to statute and from statute
to facts, and the processes of interpretation and application are telescoped
together in a manner which defies separation. Those who make the
distinction admit that the process is not finished when the meaning is
found. The application of the law to the facts may be difficult and may
require the use of the judicial attitudes of strict and liberal construction. If
the application of the law can still be doubtful, the distinction does not
seem to serve any practical purpose. 73
Nowhere is this problem more pervasive, and nowhere is there more
inconsistency, than in the Supreme Court's recent treatment of discrimi-
nation cases. In all of these cases the basic issue is the same: does the act
complained of amount to discrimination within the meaning of the
statute? The nature of the question is both factual and legal although
courts have spent considerable energy attempting to label it either as
"fact" or "law."
A comparison of two 1996 cases is useful. In the first case, 74 Madeline
Gould was refused membership in the male-only Yukon Order of
Pioneers, an order which, apart from its social activities, collected Yukon
history. Gould alleged that her exclusion amounted to discrimination
contrary to the Yukon Human Rights Act.75 The board of inquiry found
discrimination; ultimately, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the
standard of review was correctness and quashed the board decision.76
In the second case 77 David Atlas complained to the school board when
Malcolm Ross, a teacher of one of the Atlas children, was permitted to
remain in the classroom despite having made anti-Jewish statements
outside of it. The school board did not remove Ross. Atlas alleged that this
failure to remove Ross amounted to discrimination contrary to s.5(1)(b)
of the New Brunswick Human Rights Act,78 which prohibited dis-
crimination on the basis of "race, colour, religion, national origin,
ancestry .... ".9 The board of inquiry found that Ross's comments and
the school board's failure to discipline him were both discriminatory. The
same Supreme Court judges who decided that no deference was due the
board of inquiry in the Gould case unanimously held that deference
should be shown the board of inquiry in the Ross case.
73. J.A. Cory, "Administrative Law and the Interpretation of Statutes" (1935-36) 1 U.T.LJ.
286 at 290-1.
74. Gould, supra note 1.
75. Human Rights Act, R.S.Y. 1986, c.1 1 (Supp.), s.8A.
76. Gould, supra note 1. Iacobucci J. wrote for the majority (Lamer CJ.C., Sopinka,
Gonthier, Cory and Major JJ. concurring); LaForest J. wrote concurring reasons; L'Heureux-
Dubd and McLachlin JJ. dissented, each writing their own reasons.
77. Ross, supra note 58.
78. Human Rights Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c.H-I 1.
79. Ibid, s. 5(1)(b).
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In both cases, it was necessary for the Boards of Inquiry to analyze the
facts to see if they fell within the meaning of human rights statutes. This
issue contained elements of both fact and law. In Gould, for the majority,
Justice Iacobucci held that all of the evidence was agreed and nearly all
was in written form. In the circumstances, he concluded that the issue
was, "not the facts themselves but rather the inferences to be drawn from
agreed facts."80 He concluded that no deference was warranted where the
tribunal had not "seen and heard" witnesses. Justice La Forest agreed that
no deference was necessary but for different reasons.81 He held that the
issue of "services available to the public" was a matter of statutory
interpretation and as such a general legal question. Justice L'Heureux-
Dub6, dissenting, held that the impugned findings were "primarily
factual in nature." 2 She pointed to a finding that the Lodge's discrimi-
natory membership policy had an impact on the quality of its historical
work. She also pointed out that "the board's finding that the Lodge's
activities fell within this definition [of "service to the public"] involves
the application of the law to the facts."83 The issue being factual, the
board, in her judgment, was entitled to deference. 8
In Ross, the unanimous court deferred to the board of inquiry holding
as follows:85
80. Gould, supra note 1 at 456.
81. Justice LaForest cited Berg, supra note 58. This was a discrimination case in which the
issue was nearly identical. In Berg the member-designate of the British Columbia Council of
Human Rights held that there had been discrimination. Chief Justice Lamer, writing for the
majority, held that the interpretation of the Act was a question of law on which no deference
would be shown. Nevertheless, he held that the member-designate's interpretation was correct
and the finding of discrimination should be upheld. Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 joined the
majority, writing separate reasons, presumably because she agreed with the result and not,
given her dissents in Mossop and Gould, because she felt that Human Rights Tribunals should
be held to a standard of correctness in interpreting their empowering statute. Still, one worries
about result-driven labeling.
82. Gould, supra note I at 492.
83. Ibid.
84. Justice L'Heureux-Dub, who held that deference was owed to the Board, labeled the
nature of the question differently. These included "considerations of human rights policy
which preclude its [the issue's] classification as a general question of law" (ibid.) and an issue
where the "factual and legal elements are inseparable" (Gould, supra note 1 at 494). Gould is
not the only discrimination case in which the majority and minority parted company on how
the nature of the question should be labeled: see Zurich, supra note 11.
85. Supra note 58 at 15. This cite seems to support Justice L'Heureux-Dub's dissent in
Dickason, supra note 11 at 449, where she commented that "discrimination cases such as this
are fact-driven, and ... outcome will vary with the evidence submitted." It also seems to
contradict Justice lacobucci's position in Gould, supra note I where inferences drawn from
albeit agreed facts were distinguished from fact-finding and accorded no deference: see Gould,
ibid. at 455-56.
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A finding of discrimination is impregnated with facts, facts which the
Board of Inquiry is in the best position to evaluate. The Board heard
considerable evidence relating to the allegation of discrimination and was
required to assess the credibility of the witnesses' evidence and draw
inferences from the factual evidence presented to it in making a determi-
nation as to the existence of discrimination. Given the complexity of the
evidentiary inferences made on the basis of the facts before the Board, it
is appropriate to exercise a relative degree of deference to the finding of
discrimination, in light of the Board's superior expertise in fact finding, a
conclusion supported by the existence of words importing a limited
privative effect into the constituent legislation.
The only real difference between the two cases was in the form of the
evidence. In Gould it was written; in Ross it was viva voce. In both cases
the court had to draw inferences from the evidence. For that, the form of
the evidence should not have been determinative. Nevertheless, in Gould
the Court intervened; in Ross it deferred. The decision in Ross was not
"purely factual": the statute did not apply itself. Legal issues in the case
included whether the school board was liable for human rights violations
of its teachers outside the classroom, whether "poisoned environment"
should be incorporated into the definition of discrimination, and whether
an in-classroom remedy was appropriate for out-of-classroom violations.
The point is not that one judge got the labelling right and the other got
it wrong. The point is that the fact/law dichotomy does a very poor job of
explaining why the court defers in one case and not in the other. In both
cases the issue is the same, the expertise of the boards of inquiry is
presumably the same, and the boards are making the same determination
as to whether, on the facts, discrimination in law has taken place. The fact/
law distinction does not reconcile the divergent results by telling us why
deference is due in one case and not the other.
Once the nature of the question has been analyzed and a descriptive
label chosen, the final step for the court in deciding how much deference
to show is determining whether the tribunal's expertise, if any, is relevant
to the issue at hand. It does this by comparing the role of the tribunal, and
inevitably also the role of the court, with the nature of the question. This
is an exercise in cartography. A series of mapping labels are used to
describe the outcome of this comparison. The question is found to be
"within"86 or "outside" 87 the tribunal's expertise, or more poetically, is
86. See Gould, supra note 1 at 489 and Shaw, supra note 25 at 454-5.
87. See Gould, supra note I at 491; Shaw, supra note 25 at 454-5; Goldhawk, supra note 1
at 429; and Dayco, supra note 17 at 632.
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or is not at the "centre,"88 "core,"8 9 or "heart" 9 of its expertise, or is
"squarely" 91 within that expertise or an "integral part" of that expertise. 92
Where there is agreement amongst the judges on the expertise of the
tribunal and on the nature of the question, there is generally agreement on
whether to defer to the tribunal. This is usually the case where the tribunal
is expert in administering a technical or highly specialized regulatory
regime. Thus, in Pezim, the question of what constitutes "material
change" for disclosure purposes under the British Columbia Securities
Act is, "an issue which goes to the 'heart' of the regulatory expertise and
mandate of the Commission, i.e., regulating the securities market in the
public interest." 93 Similarly, in Domtar, the issue of compensation for
time off work after an industrial accident involves concepts that are at the
"core" of the expertise of the Commission d'appel, namely disability and
the complex system of compensation contained in the Commission's
enabling statute. 94
The problem is that judges frequently disagree on the extent of a
board's expertise and on the nature of the question before it.95 As a result,
they have trouble agreeing on whether board expertise is relevant to the
question. Mossop illustrates this. Justice La Forest, for the majority,
concluded that the issue of discrimination on the basis of "family status"
was a question that fell outside the board's expertise. He held:
The superior expertise of a human rights tribunal relates to fact-finding and
adjudication in a human rights context. It does not extend to general
questions of law such at the one at issue in this case. These are ultimately
matters within the province of the judiciary and involve concepts of
statutory interpretation and general legal reasoning which the courts must
be supposed competent to perform9 6
88. See PSAC #2, supra note 15 at 677.
89. See Domtar,supra note 25 at 398; Goldhawk,supra note 1 at 422; Dayco,supra note 17
at 627.
90. See Pezim,supra note 1 at4I 1; Goldhawk,supra note 1 at 400 and 429; and CUPE,supra
note 2 at 424.
91. See Bradco, supra note 9 at 414, Sopinka J.; Gould, supra note 1 at 491 and 494,
L'Heureux-Dub6 J.; Bell Canada v. Canadian Radio-Television & Telecommunications
Commission, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1722,60 D.L.R. (4th) 682 at 699 [hereinafter Bell Canada cited
to D.L.R.].
92. See Goldhawk, supra note 1 at 401, lacobucci J.
93. Pezim, supra note I at 411, lacobucci J.
94. Supra note 25 at 398-9, L'Heureux-Dub6. See also Bradco, supra note 9 at 417-18 for
what was at the 'core' of the labour arbitrator's expertise.
95. See the disagreement between the majority and the minority in Goldhawk, supra note t.
96. Supra note I at 675-6.
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In dissent, Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 held that the issue of interpreting
family status was at the "core" of the tribunal's jurisdiction. She reached
the opposite conclusion on relevance:
As to the matter of the problem at issue, tribunals appointed under the Act
have a mandate to determine whether or not a given practice or policy has
discriminated against a complainant on the basis of one of the enumerated
grounds set out s. 3 of the Act. The enumerated grounds of discrimination
are not defined within the Act and, as is clear later in these reasons, it was
the intention of the legislature that, in the event of any ambiguity, the
Commission and its tribunals would have the task of determining the
meaning and scope of these concepts. This is at the core of the board's
jurisdiction. 97
In the final analysis, the court's theory for determining the expertise of
administrative agencies, and so for determining the degree of deference
that they will be shown, falls apart under its own subjectivity. In terms of
measuring expertise, the focus on the "role of the tribunal" is too narrow
an inquiry to yield a true appreciation of the agency's degree of special-
ization. In terms of the relevance of expertise, the description and
mapping of the "nature of the question" is too much based on result-
driven labelling to provide a satisfactory answer to the question of who
does what best and why. In the result, the degree of judicial scrutiny of
administrative decisions appears to depend on little more than judicial
preference for certain tribunals and particular outcomes.
However, this is only the court's announced theory of expertise and
rationale for deference. There is reason to look beyond what the court says
it is doing to what it actually does. When the court talks about a
specialized board, it is not examining the absolute level of the board's
expertise. Rather, it is forming an impression about the board's relative
expertise as compared to the court's. Justice Sopinka, in Bradco,98 stated
that, "a lack of relative expertise on the part of the tribunal vis- A-vis the
particular issue before it as compared with the reviewing court is a ground
97. Ibid. at 693-4. Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 also disagreed with the majority on the relevance
of the Human Rights Tribunal's expertise in Gould, supra note 1. The majority saw the issue
as a general question of law. She held at 494 that "the resolution of these and other factual issues
falls squarely within the Board's specialized mandate . ..."
Although this difficulty agreeing on the relevance of a tribunal's expertise primarily
arises with human rights tribunals, the problem surfaces elsewhere as well. In Dayco, supra
note 17 the issue of the relative expertise of arbitrators arose. Justice LaForest, for the majority,
concluded at 632: "the question to be decided requires consideration of concepts that are
analogous to certain common law notions - "vesting" and accrued contractual rights - that fall
outside the tribunal's sphere of exclusive expertise." Justice Cory, in dissent, held that labour
arbitrators ought to be shown deference.
98. Supra note 9.
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for a refusal of deference."99 The board's public reputation for compe-
tence will influence a judge when this comparison of expertise is made.
This link is made possible in part because expertise is a vague and
impressionistic concept. Thus, the stronger the board's reputation, the
more the relative expertise balance will favour the board and the more
likely the court will defer to board decisions. The weaker the board's
reputation, the more the relative expertise calculation will suggest to the
court that it has an obligation to review substantively the board's rulings.
The court takes a special interest in issues it considers of general public
importance or far-reaching consequence. 00 The court will not defer on
such issues unless the relative expertise calculation clearly favours the
board. This will not be the case if the board's reputation is weak. The
problem is not that a board is unspecialized, although the court will
question its expertise; the problem is not that the nature of the question
is insufficiently factual, although the court will label it a general question
of law; the problem is not that the issue is distant from the core of the
board's mandate, although the court will map it outside the boundary. The
problem is that the court will not leave a question that it regards as being
of significant public importance to an agency whose reputation for
competence is suspect.
Next to constitutional matters, the Supreme Court regards human right
matters as having an overriding importance. 1'0 The Court's interest may
in part be historical given the traditional role that the common law court
has played in protecting individual liberty, may in part be constitutional
given the court's unsatisfactory experience with the old Bill ofRights and
its activist experience under the Charter, and may in part be hierarchical
given the Court's claim, as the highest judicial organ, to treat the most
serious questions. If public confidence in human rights agencies is weak,
and their reputation clouded, a one-person human rights board of inquiry
will lack the necessary legitimacy to resolve controversial moral issues
having broad social impact. That person will not have the same moral
authority, or strong reputation, as a nine-judge Supreme Court. In that
99. Ibid. at414-5.
100. These phrases are taken from Justice McLachlin's dissent in Goldhawk, supra note 1.
The CBC's obligations under the Broadcasting Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.B-9, and the standard of
conduct of the CBC, were considered matters of general public importance.
101. In Berg, supra note 58 at 677, the Chief Justice referred to "the unique nature of human
rights legislation," its "privileged status," and referred to Ontario (Human Rights Commission)
v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536, 23 D.L.R. (4th) 321 at 329 rev'ing 138 D.L.R.
(3d) 133,3 C.H.R.R. D/1071 (C.A.), aft'ing 133 D.L.R. (3d) 611,3 C.H.R.R. D/796 (Div. Ct.)
where such legislation was held to be "not quite constitutional but certainly more than the
ordinary."
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sense he or she is less qualified to resolve finally questions raising diverse
issues that go to the very nature of our society. It is in these circumstances
that the court feels relative expertise favours the judges.
On the other hand, where a board's reputation is strong the Court is
content to leave substantive decisions on important matters with the
administrators. This is so, for example, with securities commissions that
enjoy a broad public interest mandate and policy development role'0 2 and
labour boards responsible for overseeing the development of a sophisti-
cated statutory regime. 103 So long as no crisis develops, these boards tend
to enjoy public confidence, in part because the complexity of what they
do makes it difficult for the public to second guess them."° In these
circumstances, reputation and relative expertise favours the administra-
tors. Despite the far-reaching consequences of board decisions in these
areas,judges will show little interest in becoming involved so long as the
public remains confident that the administrators are qualified to do their
job.
Expertise is not the only word in the judicial review lexicon that is
capable of acting as a proxy for reputation. The idea of bias, like the idea
of expertise, is a vague, impressionistic factor that affects reputation. It
is also an idea capable of providing camouflage for a judge minded to
review the decisions of an agency that lacks legitimacy because of the low
public esteem in which it is held.
II. Bias
Bias refers to the mental capacity of a decision-maker to be persuaded by
rational argument. States of mind0 " span a spectrum from judicial
impartiality'06 to prejudice. An impartial or open mind is one capable of
dispassionately considering the evidence,' of relying on no other
102. See Pezim, supra note I at 407-8.
103. See Dayco, supra note 17 at 632-3.
104. So long as affordable gas flows in the pipeline, the public is unlikely to challenge the
conduct of the hearings that produced that result.
105. Valente v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673, 24 D.L.R. (4th) 161 at 169 [hereinafter
Valente cited to D.L.R.], cited in Ruffo v. Conseil de la Magistrature, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 267, 130
D.L.R. (4th) 1 at 19 [hereinafter Ruffo cited to D.L.R.].
106. Valente, ibid. at 169. See also Newfoundland Telephone Co. v. Newfoundland (Board
of Commissioners of Public Utilities), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 623, 89 D.L.R. (4th) 289 at 298
[hereinafter Nfld. Tel. cited to D.L.R.], citing Szilard v. Szasz, [1955] S.C.R. 3, 1 D.L.R. 370,
Rand J. [hereinafter Szilard cited to D.L.R.]. See also R. v. Lippe, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 114, 64
C.C.C. (3d) 513 at 535 [hereinafter Lippe cited to C.C.C.].
107. See Sivaguru v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration) (1992) 16 Imm. L.R.
(2d) 85 at 102, 139 N.R. 220 (Fed. C.A.) [hereinafter Sivaguru]; see also Nfld. Tel., supra note
106 at 300.
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authority but the law, and of deciding solely on the basis of one's own
conscience and opinion.'08 It is a disinterested mind, 109 the mind of a
decision-maker who has no personal stake in the outcome."0 A preju-
diced or closed mind is one that has so pre-judged the matter, and is so
incapable of change," 1 that any representation to the contrary would be
futile.' "2 The question on judicial review is whether, and to what degree,
an administrative decision-maker must be amenable to persuasion;
whether, and to what extent, the taint of personal interest will be
tolerated.'
Courts have historically defined bias by categorizing it in accordance
with the nature of the decision-maker's personal interest in the outcome
of the case." 4 It is possible to think of these categories as categories of
temptation and these personal interests as irrelevant motives. Is there a
danger in a given context that would close the decision-maker's mind to
persuasion and would constrain his or her ability to decide freely
according to conscience?
The categorization of bias has proceeded tentatively with mistakes
being made and later corrected. Energy Probe identified pecuniary and
non-pecuniary interests as sources of temptation. The latter included
"kinship, friendship, partisanship, particular professional or business
relationship with one of the parties, animosity towards someone inter-
ested, predetermined mind as to the issue involved, etc.""' In other
words, the non-pecuniary category encompassed every interest, every
temptation, but money.
108. See Consolidated Bathurst, supra note 15 at 563.
109. See Canadian Cable Television Ass'n v.American College Sports Collective of Canada
Inc. (1991), 81 D.L.R. (4th) 376 at 399,4 Admin. L.R. (2d) 61 (Fed. C.A.) [hereinafter Sports
Collective cited to D.L.R.], citing Re Gooliah and Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
(1967), 63 D.L.R. (2d) 224 at 227-8,59 W.W.R. 705 (Man. C.A.).
110. See Consolidated Bathurst, supra note 15 at 532.
111. Old St. Boniface Residents Assn. Inc. v. Winnipeg (City), [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1170, 75
D.L.R. (4th) 385 at 409 [hereinafter Old St. Boniface cited to D.L.R.].
112. Ibidat409.
113. Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177,17
D.L.R. (4th) 422 at 464, cited in Idziak v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 631,
97 D.L.R. (4th) 577 at 596 [hereinafter ldziak cited to D.L.R.], and Pearlman v. Manitoba Law
Society Judicial Committee, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 869, 84 D.L.R. (4th) 105 at 115 [hereinafter
Pearlman cited to D.L.R.].
114. Re Energy Probe and Atomic Energy Control Board, [ 198511 F.C. 563, 15 D.L.R. (4th)
48 at 62-3 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused (1985), 15 D.L.R. (4th) 48n (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
Energy Probe cited to D.L.R.].
115. lbid.at61.
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The motions judge in Energy Probe attempted to distinguish between
pecuniary interests and reasonable apprehension of bias. Justice Marceau,
of the Federal Court of Appeal, correctly observed that such a distinction
would be "difficult to defend logically since it would present no basis for
comparison, one group being identified by the nature of the interest, the
other by the possible reaction the presence thereof may inspire in the mind
of the public."" 6 Pecuniary is a category of interest; reasonable appre-
hension of bias, as will be discussed below, is a standard of proof.
Curiously, Justice Marceau went on to make his own error. He held that
an interest of a pecuniary nature, "does not raise a question of apprehen-
sion of bias."'"I7 However, even where a decision-maker has a possible
pecuniary interest in the outcome, there is no reason why actual bias must
be proven. Reasonable apprehension of bias should be enough to merit
disqualification.118
A categorization difficulty also arose in Valente. The Court, following
certain academic commentary, made a distinction between impartial-
ity- a "state of mind"-and independence-a "status or relationship to
others.""' 9 In Lippi, the Chief Justice referred to independence as "the
cornerstone ,a necessary prerequisite, forjudicial impartiality. '"2' In fact,
independence is a category of bias. A decision-maker who is dependent
on others with an interest in the proceedings will not be able to bring an
open state of mind to the task of adjudication. 2'
The law has now evolved to the point where it is possible to identify
four different categories of personal interest that risk closing a decision-
maker's mind to the merits of the parties' arguments. Each category
originates in a different aspect of the decision-maker's personality. Each
116. Ibid.at63.
117. Ibid. at 64.
118. Justice Sopinka so held in Old St. Boniface,supra note 11. See also Szilard, supra note
106, cited in Nfld. Tel., supra note 106 at 298 where Justice Rand held as a requirement of
"judicial impartiality" that each party was entitled to a "sustained confidence in the indepen-
dence of mind" of those who sit in judgment of him.
119. Valente, supra note 105 at 169-70.
120. Lippi, supra note 106 at 530, cited in Ruffo, supra note 105 at 19.
121. Lippg, ibid. provides further evidence of the court working out the content of the
categories or, in this case, subcategories of bias. The Chief Justice, writing in the minority at
529-30, would have limited judicial independence to relationships with government under-
stood as any agency that could exert pressure through the authority of the state. The majority,
at 540, citing R. v. Beauregard, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56, 30 D.L.R. (4th) 481 [hereinafter
Beauregard cited to D.L.R.], saw a potential danger to independence arising out of any
relationship - be it government, pressure group, individual or even another judge.
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poses aparticular temptation. 12 2 Each may be present alone, or in various
combinations, in different factual settings.
123
The first category of personal interest originates in the decision-
maker's ties to others. Lack of independence may result from the
decision-maker's past'24 or present 125 connections to others or from
outside interference. That outside interference may come from either
inside 126 or outside of the decision-maker's agency. If outside the agency,
the interference may have its source in a state authority, 27 such as a
122. The following chart maps the categories and sub-categories of bias discussed in this
article. "Personal interest" refers to the nature of the decision-maker's potential personal
interest in the outcome of the case- the influence or temptation that could potentially close the
decision-maker's mind to relevant arguments. "Antidote" refers to countervailing factors that
neutralize any potential personal interest that the decision-maker might have in the outcome.
Antidotes can apply to any of the categories of bias but are most commonly associated with one
category.
Personal Interest Category of Bias Sub-Category of Bias Antidote to Reasonable
Apprehension of Bias
1. One's relationships Independence from within one's agency Objective Safeguards (i.e.
• from governmental entities oaths, tenure, arms-length
* from non-governmental entities relationships etc.)
• from past personal connections
* from present personal connections
2. One's needs Conflict of Interest • pecuniary Remoteness (trivial)
* non-pecuniary
3. One's preconceptions Partisanship with respect to individuals Nature & function of
* with respect to issues tribunal; words and conduct
* with respect to law of tribunal
4. One's involvement Multiplicity of Roles investigator Legislation
* complainant
* prosecutor
- judge in first instance
• appellate judge
123. In Leshner v. Ontario (Deputy Attorney-General) (1992), 96 D.L.R. (4th) 41, 10 O.R.
(3d) 732 (Div. Ct.), the decision-maker was held to have created a reasonable apprehension of
bias because he had a reporting relationship to the respondent (relationship - personal
connection), an interest in vindicating himself (conflict of interest - non-pecuniary), and had
acted as both complainant and adjudicator (multiplicity of roles). No antidotal countervailing
factor was present to relieve the reasonable apprehension of bias.
124. Committee For Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369,68
D.L.R. (3d) 716 [hereinafter Comm. For Justice cited to D.L.R.].
125. Dulmage v. Ontario (Police Complaints Commissioner) (1994), 120 D.L.R. (4th) 590
at 598, 21 O.R. (3d) 356 (C.A.) [hereinafter Dulmage cited to O.R.] (bias found); Leshner,
supra note 123 (bias found).
126. Consolidated Bathurst, supra note 15 (no bias found); Tremblay, supra note 15 (bias
found).
127. In the judicial context see Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) v. Tobiass,
[1997] S.C.C.A. No.61 (QL).
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member of the government, or in a private body,' 28 such as a pressure
group or corporate entity. The pressure may take the form of dictation or
may be more subtle.
Second, conflict of interest, originating in a decision-maker's own
needs, creates bias. That conflict may be of a material kind, most
commonly pecuniary, 29 or may be of an ethereal, but no less powerful,
nature. 30 Desire for promotion is an example.
Third, partisanship, originating in the decision-maker's personal be-
liefs, threatens an open mind. Partisanship may be evident in respect of
people,' 3 ' especially a party to the proceedings, and in respect of issues
raised by the proceedings.' 32 It may be manifest through words or
conduct.'33 Whether partisanship will close the mind, and amount to legal
bias, will depend on the strength of the decision-maker's commitment to
a particular position, the degree and timing of any public advocacy of that
position, and the extent to which the position is particularized in a manner
that resembles the specifics of the issue in the case. 34 It is clear that
predetermined positions with respect to the law are not considered a
partisan interest that would amount to legal bias.'35
128. See Beauregard, supra note 121 at 491 where the "broader understanding" of "judicial
independence" was adopted:
no outsider - be it government, pressure group, individual or even another judge
- should interfere in fact, or attempt to interfere, with the way in which a judge
conducts his or her case and makes his or her decision.
Cited by Gonthier, J. in Lippo, supra note 106 at 540.
129. Energy Probe, supra note 114 (no bias found).
130. Leshner, supra note 123; Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. v. Ontario (Human Rights
Commission) (1993), 13 OR. (3d) 824,109 D.L.R. (4th) 214 (Div. Ct.) [hereinafterA & Pcited
to OR.].
131. Re Golomb and College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (1976), 68 D.L.R. (3d)
25 (H.Ct.J.) [hereinafter Golomb]; Sivaguru, supra note 107.
132. Nfld. Tel., supra note 106; Old St. Boniface, supra note 111 ; Save Richmond Farmland
Society v. Richmond (Township), [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1213,75 D.L.R. (4th) 425; Large v. Stratford
(City) (1992), 92 D.L.R. (4th) 565 (Ont. Gen. Div.) [hereinafter Large].
133. "Two refugee board members sacked: Pair giggled, passed notes during Iranian's torture
testimony," The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (7 March 1992) A6; "Sexist notes found, refugee
lawyer says: Board officials accused of comments," The [Toronto] Globe and Mail
(17February 1992) A8.
134. Nfld. Tel., supra note 106; Large, supra note 132; Ellis-Don Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour
Relations Board) (1992), 95 D.L.R. (4th) 56,6 Admin. L.R. (2d) 318 (Div. Ct.), rev'd (1994),
110 D.L.R. (4th) 731,24 Admin. L.R. (2d) 122 (Div. Ct.), leave to appeal to C.A. refused,
[199416 O.L.R.B. Rep. 801 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (1995), 118 D.L.R. (4th)
vi (note), 24 Admin. L.R. (2d) 122n (S.C.C.).
135. K.C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, 2d ed., Vol. III (San Diego: K.C. Davis, 1980)
at 372-7; Comm. For Justice, supra note 124 at 739-40.
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Fourth, multiplicity of roles, originating in the decision-maker's prior
involvement in the matter, poses a danger of bias. The various potentially
conflicting roles include: investigator, party to the proceeding, prosecu-
tor, trial judge, and appeal judge.'36
The legal rule against bias is expressed in the Latin phrase nemojudex
in causa sua debet esse - no man should be judge in his own cause.' 137
A "judge in his own cause" has a personal stake in the outcome of the
cause, one that exhibits all four of the personal interests described above.
He or she lacks independence, has an obvious conflict of interest, is
naturally partisan and plays the role of both party and judge. That is why
Justice Marceau, in Energy Probe, felt it "trite to say that the most obvious
and most easily perceived practical application of [the bias principle] is
that no one should be permitted to be judge in his own cause.' 38
This situation arose in A & P.139 The adjudicator in a case of alleged
systemic sex-discrimination being prosecuted by the Human Rights
Commission was herself a complainant represented by the Commission
in an ongoing case of alleged sex-discrimination. In other words, her
decision as adjudicator risked becoming a precedent in her own cause.
Despite the fact that the adjudicator's role as complainant in the ongoing
complaint was attenuated and remote - she was one of 120 complainants
and a 12-person steering committee and the complaint was inactive-the
Divisional Court held that her descent, "personally, as a party, into the
very arena over which she [was] appointed to preside in relation to the
very same issues she has to decide," created a reasonable apprehension
of bias. 14°
Without the confidence of the public, administrative agencies and
officials would find it difficult to implement government policy. Biased
administrators forfeit confidence, in part because they have breached the
public trust by preferring their own self-interest to that of the public, in
136. Law Society of Upper Canada v. French,[ 1975]2 S.C.R. 767,49 D.L.R. (3d) 1; Re WD.
Latimer Co. Ltd. and Bray (1974), 52 D.L.R. (3d) 161,6 O.R. (2d) 129. C.A.) [hereinafter
Latimer]; Brosseau v. Alberta Securities Commission, [ 1989] 1 S.C.R. 301,57 D.L.R. (4th)
458 [hereinafter Brosseau]; EA. Manning Ltd. v. Ontario Securities Commission (1995), 23
O.R. (3d) 257, 125 D.L.R. (4th) 305 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (1995), 125
D.L.R. (4th) vii (note), 32 Admin L.R. (2d) 1 (S.C.C.).
137. Pearlman, supra note 113 at 115.
138. Supra note 114 at 61.
139. Supra note 130.
140. Ibid. at 834. In Pearlman, supra note 113, where the allegation was conflict of interest
alone, and the matter was remote and involved 'minuscule' amounts, the appropriate conclu-
sion was reached. In Leshner, supra note 123 at 44, bias was also found where the decision-
maker "had an interest in vindicating himself." He was also in a reporting relationship with the
respondent.
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part because they have undermined the possibility of meaningful citizen
input by asking for submissions when their mind is already closed to
persuasion. In such circumstances, the public will find it difficult to
accept any administrative decision. As Justice Laskin pointed out in
Comm. For Justice, public confidence in the impartiality of adjudicative
agencies is required to further the public interest. 4'
Given the importance of public confidence for effective administra-
tion, proof of bias must not be made too difficult. Simply doing justice
will not guarantee public confidence; rather, "justice... should mani-
festly. and undoubtedly be seen to be done."'4 Where the preservation of
public confidence is at stake, the need to ensure the appropriate level of
impartiality requires that one err on the side of caution by lowering the
standard of proof.
The court makes it easier to prove bias in three ways. First, it is not
necessary to prove that a particular decision-maker was actually biased:
it is sufficient that he or she give the appearance of bias to a reasonable
person. 43 Justice de Grandpr6, in his dissent in Comm. For Justice
formulated the test as follows:
[T]he apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable
and right-minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtain-
ing thereon the required information. In the words of the Court of Appeal,
... that test is "what would an informed person, viewing the matter
realistically and practically-and having thought the matter through-
conclude."'"
141. Comm. For Justice, supra note 124 at 733. See also Justice Cory's comment on this
observation in Nfld. Tel., supra note 106 at 298.
Where the administrative agency is performing an adjudicative function, the observa-
tion of Justice Le Dain in Valente, supra note 105 on the importance of public confidence in
the functioning of the courts applies equally to the functioning of administrative agencies. He
stated at 172:
Both independence and impartiality are fundamental not only to the capacity to do
justice in a particular case but also to individual and public confidence in the
administration ofjustice. Without that confidence the system cannot command the
respect and acceptance that are essential to its effective operation.
142. Consolidated Bathurst, supra note 15 at 562, where Gonthier J. cites the well known
maxim from R. v. Sussex Justices, [1924] 1 K.B. 256 at 259.
143. Tremblay, supra note 15 at 627. See also Re Canada (Anti-Dumping Tribunal), [1972]
F.C. 1078 at 1101 (T.D.) where Justice Cattanach refers to "tests [that] depend upon an
appearance of bias rather than its presence in actuality" and observes that "[a]arances dominate
the tests."
144. Supra note 124 at 735, also cited in Valente, supra note 105 at 169. Note that in Comm.
For Justice the reasonable apprehension of bias test was being applied to determine if the
decision-maker's past relationships would compromise his independence in the eyes of a
reasonable man.
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Justice Cory, in Nfld. Tel., provided the justification for the reasonable
apprehension standard of proof test:
The duty to act fairly includes the duty to provide procedural fairness to the
parties. That simply cannot exist if an adjudicator is biased. It is, of course,
impossible to determine the precise state of mind of an adjudicator who has
made an administrative board decision. As a result, the courts have taken
the position that an unbiased appearance is, in itself, an essential compo-
nent of procedural fairness. To ensure fairness the conduct of members of
administrative tribunals has been measured against a standard of reason-
able apprehension of bias. The test is whether a reasonably informed
bystander could reasonably perceive bias on the part of an adjudicator. 145
Second, it is not necessary to prove that the particular decision-maker
was biased: it is sufficient to prove that the administrative system is
structured in such a way as to create a reasonable apprehension of bias on
an institutional level.146 If systemic bias can be established "in a substan-
tial number of cases," there is no need ever to deal with it on a case-by-
case basis."' Chief Justice Lamer modified the reasonable apprehension
of bias test to apply on the institutional level as follows:
Having regard for a number of factors including, but not limited to, the
nature of the occupation and the parties who appear before this type of
judge, will there be a reasonable apprehension of bias in the mind of a fully
informed person in a substantial number of cases?148
Third, it is not necessary in proving bias to engage in an objective
inquiry into the decision-maker's subjective state of mind. It is sufficient
to identify objective indicators that act as concrete indicia of bias. In
considering particular decision-makers, the reasonable member of the
public will consider objective guarantees of independence such as
security of tenure and financial security,14 9 objective safeguards such as
voluntary attendance at full board meetings, 50 provable relationships
such as kinship 5 ' or professional contact,'5 2 identifiable pecuniary'53 or
145. Supra note 106 at 297.
146. Lippi, supra note 106 at 531.
147. Ibid. at 534.
148. Ibid. [italics in original]
149. See e.g. Valente, supra note 105 at 170-5.
150. See Consolidated Bathurst, supra note 15 at 563 and Tremblay,supra note 15. See also
Ruffo, supra note 105 at 43 where the safeguard was the judicial oath and occupational skill
of the decision-maker.
151. Spence v. Prince Albert (City) Commissioners of Police (1987), 25 Admin. L.R. 90,53
Sask. R. 35 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (1987), 58 Sask. R. 80 (note) (S.C.C.).
152. See Comm. For Justice, supra note 124.
153. See Energy Probe, supra note 114 and Pearlman, supra note 113.
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non-pecuniary gain, 54 specific words 55 or conduct 56 and documented
past activity. 57 In dealing with institutional bias,the reasonable member
of the public will consider the "objective status"' 58 of the tribunal as
evidenced by recruitment and appointment of members, institutional
structures defined by statute and regulation, 59 operating rules,"6 codes
of conduct 61 and oaths,'62 and the pattern of case results. All of these
attributes are observable, and so capable of proof, in a way that the
metaphysical operation of the mind is not.
Justice de Grandpr6 defined the reasonable person in the apprehension
of bias test as an "informed person" who had obtained "the required
information.' ' 63 In applying the test, that person would take all relevant
factors into account.' 64 In some cases, an informed person would not
apprehend bias on the basis of one factor. In other cases, an informed
person would consider a number of factors taken together before conclud-
ing that there was bias: the whole is more than the sum of the parts.t65
In some cases, one factor taken alone may create the apprehension of
bias but the countervailing factors may neutralize that impression. There
are four such factors, each applicable to any of the four categories of bias
but each generally associated with one of the categories. First, a reason-
able member of the public would be aware of any safeguards that would
154. See Leshner,supra note 123 at 44 where a decision-maker's reporting relationship to the
respondent made it inappropriate for him to determine issues of credibility between the
respondent and the applicant. See also A & P, supra note 130 where the decision-maker's
decision could have become a precedent in her own cause.
155. Golomb, supra note 131; Sivaguru, supra note 107.
156. Ibid. See also Begum v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1995]
F.C.J. No. 382 (T.D.).
157. See MacBain v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) (1985), 62 N.R. 117,
22 D.L.R. (4th) 119 (Fed. C.A.) [hereinafter MacBain cited to D.L.R.] and Re Toronto
(Metropolitan) Police Complaints Board, [1987] O.J. 1966, Action No. # 1191-85 (Ont. Div.
Ct.) [unreported].
158. See Lippi, supra note 106 at 531.
159. See MacBain, supra note 157 and Lippi, ibid.
160. See Tremblay,supra note 15 and Glengarry Memorial Hospital v. Ontario (Pay Equity
Hearings Tribunal) (1993), 110 D.L.R. (4th) 260, 18 Admin. L.R. (2d) 287 (Ont. Div. Ct.),
rev'd (1995), 124 D.L.R. (4th) 82,80 O.A.C. 261, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (1995), 126
D.L.R. (4th) vii (note) (S.C.C.).
161. See Lippd, supra note 106 at 537-8.
162. See Lipp6, ibid. at 536 and Ruffo, supra note 105 at 42.
163. Comm. For Justice, supra note 124 at 735.
164. The relevant factors will depend on the facts of the case. An example of a list of various
factors in an independence case can be found in Justice Moldaver's decision in Dulmage,supra
note 125 at 598.
165. Ruffo,supra note 105 at 49. Similar logic was used in Syncrude Canada Ltd. v.Michetti
(1994), 120 D.L.R. (4th) 118, 28 Admin. L.R. (2d) 155 (C.A.), with respect to cumulative
procedural errors relative to the audi alteram partem rule.
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counter the danger of bias, especially bias caused by a lack of indepen-
dence. 166 The nature of such "protective devices"'167 will vary depending
on the threat of bias and the level of impartiality deemed appropriate in
the circumstances.168 They include security of tenure, financial security,
immunity from prosecution, codes of ethics, oaths of office, arms-length
relationships and the professional experience of the adjudicator.' 69 Where
a collegial decision-making process has been adopted, anything that
preserves the ability of a decision-maker to decide according to his or her
conscience and opinion -voluntary consultation, no recorded minutes,
no vote taking- safeguards independence. 70
Second, a reasonable member of the public would consider whether
the threat of bias was too "remote," too "contingent," too "alien," too
"speculative" or too "attenuated" to close the decision-maker's mind to
persuasion.17' The test for bias is not administered by someone with a
"very sensitive or scrupulous conscience.' 1 72 Remoteness as a
countervailing consideration arises most frequently in conflict of interest
situations. In Comm. For Justice, Chief Justice Laskin did not accept that
the decision-maker was a "stranger" to the pipeline application given his
previous involvement in preparing the application with one of the
parties. 173 On the other hand, in Energy Probe, the possibility that a
member of the Atomic Energy Control Board might realize a future profit
from contracts dependent on a licensing application currently under
consideration was too alien to constitute pecuniary bias. 74 Similarly, in
Pearlman, the "minuscule" gain realized by the Manitoba Law Society
166. Lippi, supra note 106 at 534.
167. Tremblay, supra note 15 at 625.
168. See Valente, supra note 105 at 175, where Le Dain, J. states:
It would not be feasible, however, to apply the most rigorous and elaborate
conditions of judicial independence to the constitutional requirement of indepen-
dence in s.1 1(d) of the Charter, which may have to be applied to a variety of
tribunals.
169. See Valente, ibid.; Lippd, supra note 106, and Ruffo, supra note 105 at 42. In Ruffo, the
fact that the conseil de la Magistrature inquiring into a Judge's conduct, "was for the most part
made up of judicial professionals...whose functions essentially require them to be able to
decide dispassionately between positions that are diametrically opposed" was a safeguard.
170. See Consolidated Bathurst, supra note 15 at 562-3 and Tremblay, supra note 15 at 624-5.
171. Energy Probe, supra note 114 at 62-3; Pearlman, supra note 113 at 122.
172. Comm. For Justice, supra note 124 at 736.
173. Ibid. at 731-2.
174. Supra note 114 at 63.
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from cost awards in discipline cases did not create a bias, actual or
perceived. 75
Third, a reasonable member of the public would take into account the
nature of, and function performed by, the administrative agency. Such
considerations are crucial where partisanship represents a potential
danger. Greater degrees of impartiality are demanded as one moves from
more policy-oriented functions to more adjudicative ones, 76 from elected
boards to appointed bureaucrats, and from matters of less serious to more
serious consequence. 7 For example, a reasonable member of the public
would not expect the same degree of neutral objectivity from an elected
municipal planning commission as from a medical college discipline
panel.
Fourth, a reasonable member of the public would take into account any
legislation authorizing the decision-maker's involvement in multiple
roles in the matter in question. Legislation can authorize any overlap in
investigative, prosecutorial or adjudicative function that would other-
wise raise an apprehension of bias.17
175. Supra note 113 at 122-3. Remoteness issues also arise in partisanship cases: for example,
see A & P, supra note 130 and the factors that Justice Moldaver took into account in considering
the claim of bias against Ms. Douglas in Dulmage, supra note 125 at 364 especially the
following: "What was the nature of the issue being discussed in the statements? Did the
comments relate to the critical issue or issues which the board was required to decide or were
they directed to peripheral, less consequential or general matters?"
176. The existence of a continuum was identified by Justice de Grandpr6 in Comm. For
Justice, supra note 124 at 736:
The question of bias in a member of a Court of Justice cannot be examined in the
same light as that in a member of an administrative tribunal entrusted by statute
with an administrative discretion exercised in the light of its experience and of that
of its technical advisors.
It was fully described by Justice Cory in Nfld. Tel., supra note 106 at 299:
It can be seen that there is a great diversity of administrative boards. Those that are
primarily adjudicative in their functions will be expected to comply with the standard
applicable to courts. That is to say that the conduct of the members of the Board
should be such that there could be no reasonable apprehension of bias with regard
to their decision. At the other end of the scale are boards with popularly elected
members such as those dealing with planning and development whose members are
municipal councillors. With those boards, the standard will be much more lenient.
In order to disqualify the members a challenging party must establish that there has
been a prejudgment of the matter to such an extent that any representations to the
contrary would be futile. Administrative boards that deal with matters of policy will
be closely comparable to the boards composed of municipal councillors. For those
boards, a strict application of a reasonable apprehension of bias as a test might
undermine the very role which has been entrusted to them by the legislature.
See also Justice Sopinka in Old. St. Boniface, supra note Ill at 408-9.
177. As where reputation and livelihood are at stake, see Ruffo, supra note 105 at 53 and
Dulmage, supra note 125 at 363.
178. See Latimer, supra note 136 and Brosseau, supra note 136.
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Behind these four countervailing factors lies a recognition that impar-
tiality is only one of several, sometimes competing, values that adminis-
trative law must accommodate. The need to get the regulatory job done
efficiently, with limited resources, means that it would not be "feasible"
to require "the most rigorous and elaborate conditions of judicial inde-
pendence" in every situation.'79 The need for "adjudicative coherence"
across a large number of cases, in order to reinforce the value of equal
justice, means that the purest form of impartiality may not be attain-
able. 80 The need for expertise on decision-making panels means that
adjudicators who might otherwise present the appearance of bias must be
accepted.18' The need for the participation of interest groups, and even
popularly elected politicians, in order to better reflect community values
in administrative decision-making, makes it necessary to compromise
impartiality values in favor of democratic ones. 82 Safeguards, remote-
ness, tribunal function and legislation are relevant factors to the reason-
able person because they embody values that co-exist with the concern to
avoid bias.
Reasonable apprehension of bias is a reputational test that relates to
public opinion. Reputation, defined by the Oxford Dictionary of Current
English as "what is generally ... believed about a person's or thing's
character," 181 is a measure of public trust. The bias test, a standard of
proof meant to insure that administrators act in the public rather than their
private interest, is the same kind of measure of public trust. Dussault and
Borgeat have written, "appearance dominates the [bias] tests."'84 Justice
Sopinka explicitly linked the proof of bias to public opinion:
[T]he appellant only has to establish an appearance of bias in order to oust
the tribunal's jurisdiction. For this purpose the law adopts the fiction of the
well-informed person as a means of referring to public opinion concerning
179. Valente, supra note 105 at 175.
180. Consolidated Bathurst, supra note 15 at 562.
181. See Large, supra note 132 at 572 where Justice Campbell stated that: "To exclude
everyone [from human rights inquiry boards] who ever expressed a view on human rights
issues would exclude those best qualified to adjudicate fairly and knowledgeably in a sensitive
area of public policy."
182. See Nfld. Tel., supra note 106 at 297-9. This is especially evident with the composition
of tripartite panels.
183. J.B. Sykes., ed., The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, 7th ed. (Oxford:
University Press, 1983) at 884.
184. R. Dussault & L. Borgeat, Administrative Law: A Treatise, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell,
1990), vol. 4 at 300. See also Tremblay, supra note 15 at 625 where Justice Gonthier, talking
about countervailing factors states, "Such protective devices are important when, as here, what
is at issue is also to determine whether there was an appearance of bias or lack of indepen-
dence" [italics in original].
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the credibility of these proceedings. If there is an appearance of bias,
neither the public nor the parties can trust the findings of the inquiry.181
Public opinion feeds on itself. The stronger an agency's reputation for
impartiality, the less likely the agency will appear to the public to be
biased in any particular case and, as a result, the less chance the court will
intervene on reasonable apprehension of bias grounds. The weaker an
agency's reputation for impartiality, the less confidence public opinion
will have in the impartiality of its proceedings. The public will view the
conduct of an immigration board more suspiciously if the board is already
notorious for its aggressive behaviour and intemperate comments during
past hearings. A human rights commission widely reported to have been
partisan in its dealings with one of the groups before it is more likely to
have its decisions viewed by the general public with an apprehension of
bias than a commission with a reputation amongst all of its constituents
for even-handedness. 186 Once the test is stated in terms of the appearance
of bias, once the standard is informed public opinion, and once the goal
is to maintain public confidence in the decision-maker's motives, any
inquiry into bias will be influenced by the reputation of the agency in
question.
III. Delay
After unreasonable delay, courts stay proceedings, or reduce the weight
given to "stale" evidence, in order to prevent the administrative justice
system from being brought into disrepute. 181 Justice Vancise, of the
185. Ruffo, supra note 105 at 53.
186. The case of the Ontario Human Rights Commission is instructive. Catherine Frazee,
Chief Commissioner between 1989 and 1993, acknowledged that investigating officers were
initially sympathetic to complainants and that this lack of neutrality "keeps getting us into
trouble." She also advocated that the Commission "push the envelope" and "take the borderline
cases forward." These comments received significant media coverage appearing, respectively,
in: T. Boyle, "Radical Changes urged by rights commission" The Toronto Star (1 May 1992)
A36.; "The new fights frontier" The [Toronto] Globe & Mail (6 March 1993) D6; M. G.
Crawford, "Human Rights Commissions: Politically Correct Predators?" Canadian Lawyer
(October 1991) 16. Her successor admitted that there was a perception that the Commission
was the enemy of the private sector and spoke of the need to regain a reputation for neutrality.
See J. Beaufoy,"Chief commissioner defends OHRC's delay-riddled record" Law Times (14-
20 February 1994) 3.
187. Several competing interests are affected by the way in which delay is handled. The
complainant will insist on his or her "day in court," particularly where there is only one forum
available for asserting one's rights. See Simms v. Seetech Metal Products (1993),20 C.H.R.R.
D/477 at D/481 (Ont. Bd. Inquiry) [hereinafter Simms]; Seneca College of Applied Arts and
Technology v. Bhadauria, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 181, 124 D.L.R. (3d) 193. The respondent will
object to having an allegation "hang indefinitely over one's head" and will be concerned about
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Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, described this interest in a case that
challenged the timeliness of proceedings brought under the Saskatchewan
Human Rights Code:
One last comment is required concerning the prejudice to society caused
by the delay. There is a social value in having proceedings like this dealt
with in an efficient and expeditious manner. A failure by the commission
to initiate proceedings under the appropriate sections of the Code will
reduce respect and confidence in the administration of justice. A failure to
vigorously pursue complaints of this kind and other violations will
inevitably lead to a diminution of rights sought to be provided and
protected under the Code.188
An agency with a public reputation for delay puts public "respect and
confidence in the administration ofjustice" in jeopardy. Reputation is the
measure of that confidence. In considering whether public confidence
had been breached, a judge will be influenced by the agency's reputation
for efficient management of its operations. A poor reputation will
contribute to a finding that delay in a particular case was unreasonable.
By such a finding, the court sends a powerful signal that delay is bringing
the administrative system into disrepute and that the underlying causes of
delay, be they mismanagement, lack of resources, increased demand for
services, an excessively adversarial process, or lack of will to enforce the
agency's mandate, no longer provide an adequate excuse. The court is
saying that reform measures must be undertaken in order to restore public
confidence in, and the agency's reputation for, managerial competence.
The test for determining whether delay is unreasonable is the same in
civil, I 9 criminal, 19° and administrative law. 191 It depends on the answer
the continuing availability of exonerating evidence. He or she has an interest in "being able to
respond to the allegations in the complaint and in ensuring that any findings of a contravention
of the Code are made on a basis of sufficient certainty .... (Simms, ibid.). Together with its
interest in maintaining public confidence by proceeding in a timely manner, society has an
interest in having its regulatory codes enforced.. In the human rights context, adjudicator
Backhouse has written: "At the core of the public interest is the vindication of those rights
identified by the Code as human rights." See Meissner v. Swiss Chalet (506756 Ontario Ltd.)
(No.1) (1989), 11 C.H.R.R. D/94 at D/94 (Ont. Bd. Inquiry) [hereinafter Meissner]; also cited
in Ghosh v. Domglas Inc. (1991), 16 C.H.R.R. D/16 at D/24 (Ont. Bd. Inquiry) [hereinafter
Ghosh]; and Hall v. A-I Collision and Auto Service (No.2) (1992), 17 C.H.R.R. D/204 at
D/215 (Ont. Bd. Inquiry) [hereinafter Hall].
188. Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Kodellas (1989), 60 D.L.R. (4th) 143 at
196, 10 C.H.R.R. D/6305 (Sask. C.A.) [hereinafter Kodellas cited to D.L.R.].
189. Allen v. Sir Alfred McAlpine & Sons Ltd. et al., [1968] 1 All E.R. 543 at 561 cited in
MacPhee v. Barristers' Society of New Brunswick (1983), 1 D.L.R. (4th) 156 at 162,50 N.B .R.
(2d) 61 (Q.B.) [hereinafter MacPhee cited to D.L.R.].
190. R. v. Mills, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863,29 D.L.R. (4th) 161 [hereinafter Mills cited to D.L.R.];
R. v. Askov, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199, 74 D.L.R. (4th) 355.
191. Kodellas, supra note 188. Nisbett v. Manitoba (Human Rights Commission) (1993), 101
D.L.R. (4th) 744, 14 Admin. L.R. (2d) 216 (Man. C.A.) [hereinafter Nisbett cited to D.L.R.].
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to three questions: was the delay inordinate; was it excusable; did it
substantially prejudice the respondent? Each of these questions invites a
nebulous response. Each requires a judgment call, one that would permit
agency reputation to be taken into account, if not expressly by reference
to public confidence, then implicitly by unacknowledged judicial notice.
Whether a delay is inordinate is an imprecise estimation made using
common sense and comparisons with the length of time taken to process
similar cases both inside the agency and out, and within the geographic
jurisdiction and without. The nature of the complaint, its complexity, the
existence of investigative or evidentiary difficulties, and the intervention
of outside factors such as simultaneous proceedings or unforeseen events,
must be considered. A court or board may hold an agency with a public
reputation for tardiness to a higher standard of performance by reducing
the time that it has for dealing with cases.
Whether an inordinate delay will be excused, and the normal time
frames waived, will depend on the kinds of reforms that the court or board
feels are necessary and possible. An inattentive or mismanaged bureau-
cracy192 is not the same as an overworked or underfunded one. A court or
board might be less inclined to accept accidental inattentiveness as a valid
excuse when considering an agency with a reputation for inefficiency.
This is an area in which an agency could adopt its own reforms. On the
other hand, a court or board might be more inclined to accept insufficient
resources as an excuse, particularly where funding was beyond agency
control. This would not be the case, however, if the court or board wished
to send a signal to government that underfunding was the indirect cause
of the agency's reputation eroding to the point where the public was
starting to lack confidence in its operations. Whether such a signal is sent
will depend on the extent of the loss of public confidence and on the
perceived willingness of the funding authority to act on the message.
It will also depend on the severity of the prejudice caused by the delay.
Agency reputation could become a factor in judging that severity. In
terms of the scope of prejudice, an agency with a reputation for tardiness
might find included within the ambit of prejudice not only the effect of
delay on witnesses' memories but also its effect in heightening the stress
192. See Shreve v. Windsor (City) (No.2) (1993), 18 C.H.R.R. D/363 at D/370,93 C.L.L.C.
117,024 (Ont. Bd. Inquiry) [hereinafter Shreve cited in C.H.R.R.], where the adjudicator noted
that most of the five year delay "was taken up while the file was apparently sitting on the desk
of someone at the Human Rights Commission awaiting further attention."
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and stigma faced by the respondent.'93 In terms of the weight of prejudice,
an agency with a reputation for mismanagement might find that potential
witness memory loss is not treated as a matter of mere inconvenience, but
rather as a matter of abuse ofprocess.194 In terms of the proof of prejudice,
an agency with a reputation for inefficiency might find a respondent
relieved of the burden of actually having to prove specific prejudice in
favour of an irrefutable presumption that lengthy delay creates preju-
dice. 195
If the test is met, and delay is found to be unreasonable, one of two
remedial approaches must be chosen. The "stay approach" treats unrea-
sonable delay as an abuse of process that will result in proceedings being
halted on natural justice grounds. The "evidentiary approach" treats
unreasonable delay as a matter going to the weight to be given evidence
and so to the eventual outcome of the case. The approach favoured will
depend on the relative importance attached to the competing interests of
the complainant, the respondent and society as a whole. The "stay
approach" focuses on the prejudice suffered by the respondent and
society's interest in ensuring that operational mismanagement does not
bring the agency into disrepute.' 96 The "evidentiary approach" favours
193. In Hall, supra note 187 at D/21 3, delay-induced psychological stress and stigma was not
treated as coming within the scope of prejudice. A similar result was reached in Nisbett, supra
note 191 at 754-5. The opposite conclusion was adopted in Kodellas, supra note 188 at 152.
194. In Simms, supra note 187 at D/479, memory loss was considered not to establish such
prejudice as to warrant bringing proceedings to an end but rather was "[to] be taken into account
in assessing the credibility of witnesses." Similarly in Gohm v. Domtar Inc. (No.1) (1989), 10
C.H.R.R. D/5968 at D/5970 (Ont. Bd. Inquiry) [hereinafter Gohm], delay did not constitute an
abuse of process even where evidence had gone "stale." However, in Ontario (Ministry of
Health) v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (1993), 105 D.L.R. (4th) 333 at 340 (Ont. Gen.
Div.) [hereinafter Ministry of Health], delay resulting in memory loss was a factor in
proceedings being brought to an end.
195. Actual proof of specific prejudice was required in Hyman v. Southam Murray Printing
(1982), 3. C.H.R.R. D/617 (Ont. Bd. Inquiry) [hereinafter Hyman] but a lengthy passage of
time gave rise to an irrebutable presumption of prejudice in MacPhee, supra note 187 at 162.
196. See Kodellas, supra note 188, where in a human rights case the Saskatchewan Court of
Appeal adopted this approach. For a series of discipline cases that adopts this approach, see
MacPhee, ibid.; Misra v. College of Physicians & Surgeons of Saskatchewan (1988), 52 D.L.R.
(4th) 477 at 490, 36 Admin. L.R. 298 (Sask.C.A.) [hereinafter Misra cited to D.L.R.]; Harvey
v. Law Society of Newfoundland (1992), 88 D.L.R. (4th) 487, 2 Admin. L.R. (2d) 306 (Nfld.
T.D.); but see Hammond v. Association of B.C. Professional Foresters (1991), 47 Admin. L.R.
20 (B.C.S.C.); Bennett v. British Columbia (Securities Commission) (1991), 82 D.L.R. (4th)
129 (B.C.S.C.), aff'd (1992),94 D.L.R. (4th) 339 (B.C.C.A.), appeal to S.C.C. refused (1992),
97 D.L.R. (4th) vii (note) (S.C.C.); and R.(J.) v. College of Psychologists (B.C.) (1995), 33
Admin. L.R. (2d) 174 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter R.(J.)].
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the complainant's interest in having the claim adjudicated and society's
in having its codes enforced. 197
In the criminal context, the Supreme Court of Canada has decided that
the "stay approach" will only be adopted in the "clearest of cases."'98 The
Court has yet to consider which approach should be favoured in the
administrative context. Until that happens, the remedial implications of
administrative delay will likely continue to be dealt with in a somewhat
inconsistent way. Given the reluctance to deny a complainant access to
an adjudicative forum for reasons totally unrelated to the actions of the
complainant, stays in administrative matters will probably also be re-
served for the "clearest of cases." These might include situations in which
the respondent's ability to defend, or the public's confidence in the
integrity of the administrative process, were clearly threatened. In other
words, an agency's reputation for mismanaging its operations would
have to be clearly bad to warrant granting a stay of proceedings.
The treatment of delay by human rights boards of inquiry provides an
example of the reluctance to use stays. The evidentiary approach is almost
always adopted. There are two reasons for this. First, the "quasi-consti-
tutional" importance of protecting human rights makes it difficult to
block the complainant from proceeding in the only forum in which those
rights can be enforced. Second, human rights commissions tend to deal
with high volumes of complaints. A stay in one case creates a precedent
for all other cases that have been delayed in similar circumstances for the
same or longer periods of time. Such a stay threatens to bring the work of
the commission to a standstill while it deals with the backlog and retools
case management procedures. The same factors that contribute to the
197. See Nisbett, supra note 191 where in a human rights case the Manitoba Court of Appeal
chose this approach. For a series of human rights cases that took this approach see Simms, supra
note 187; Meissner, supra note 187; Ghosh, supra note 187; Hall, supra note 187; Hyman,
supra note 195 Quereshi v. Central High School of Commerce (1987), 9 C.H.R.R. D/4527
(Ont. Bd. Inquiry); Morin v. Noranda Inc. (1988), 9 C.H.R.R. D/5245 (Ont. Bd. Inquiry)
[hereinafter Morin]; Gohm, supra note 194; Munsch v. York Condominium Corp. No. 60
(1992), 18 C.H.R.R. D/339 (Ont. Bd. Inquiry); Lampman v. Photoflair Ltd. (1992), 18
C.H.R.R. D/196 (Ont. Bd. Inquiry); Crane v. McDonnell Douglas Canada Ltd. (1993), 19
C.H.R.R. D/422 (Ont. Bd. Inquiry); Brock University v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission)
(1996), 36 Admin. L.R. (2d) 267, 91 O.A.C. 71 (Div. Ct.), leave to appeal to C.A. refused
(1996), 36 Admin. L.R. (2d) 267 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter Brock cited to Admin. L.R.]; but see
Re Commercial Union Assurance v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (1987), 59 O.R. (2d)
481,38 D.L.R. (4th) 405 (Div. Ct.), aff'd (1988), 63 O.R. (2d) 112,47 D.L.R. (4th) 477 (C.A.)
leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (1988), 65 O.R. (2d) x (note), 51 D.L.R. (4th) vii (note)
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter Commercial Union cited to O.R.]; Shreve, supra note 192; Ministry of
Health, supra note 194.
198. R.v. O'Connor, [1995]4 S.C.R. 411, 130 D.L.R. (4th) 235; R.(J.), supra note 196.
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delay make the stay remedy impractical. Both the access argument and
the volume argument discourage the granting of stays against high-
volume agencies doing remedial work.
A respondent could always seek judicial review of a board decision
refusing a stay. The difficulty is with timing. If the challenge is brought
before the board reaches a final decision, the court will likely reject it as
premature.' 99 However, after the board has reached a final decision, the
number of respondents prepared to seek judicial review on delay grounds
will be limited. Those who were found not to have breached the Code
have no interest in such a challenge. Those who were found in breach may
be reluctant to incur further delay, and possibly more prejudice, by
pursuing the matter. This will be all the more likely given the board's
adverse decision on the merits2°° and the divided jurisprudence over the
appropriate remedial approach to delay.
A bi-product of using a stay to protect the respondent's interest in a
timely process is the protection of society's interest in the efficient
operation of its agencies. 20 A stay is, in part, a sanction aimed at a slow-
moving, inefficient bureaucracy. When boards hearing preliminary mo-
tions, and courts sitting on judicial review, systematically refuse to grant
stays for delay, one of the checks that helps to maintain public confidence
in administrative agencies disappears .202
199. For cases where applications for stays were rejected as being premature, see: Latifv.
Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (1992), 4 Admin. L.R. (2d) 227, 17 C.H.R.R. D/198 at
D/198 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Braniford Police Service Board v. Ontario (Human Rights Commis-
sion) (1992), 19 C.H.R.R. D/384 at D/384 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Ontario College ofArt v. Ontario
(Human Rights Commission) (No. 1) (1992), 11 O.R. (3d) 798 at 799,99 D.L.R. (4th) 738 (Div.
Ct.); A & P, supra note 130; Hughes v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (1994),
112 D.L.R. (4th) 253 (Div. Ct.). But the rule against premature applications, while frequently
cited, is not absolute: Gage v. Ontario (Attorney General) (1992), 90 D.L.R. (4th) 537 (Div.
Ct.) states at 553, "[i]f there is a prospect of real unfairness through denial of natural justice or
otherwise, a superior court may always exercise its inherent supervisory jurisdiction to put an
end to the injustice before all the alternative remedies are exhausted"; and Ministry of Health,
supra, note 194 adds, at 341, "as a general rule ... applications for judicial review should not
be brought until the tribunal has completed its hearings and rendered its decision .... but the
court has a discretion and may intervene at an earlier stage, where justice requires that it do so."
200. What Justice Dickson referred to as the "dynamic of ascending rigidity" in his dissent
in Re Harelkin and University of Regina, [ 1979] 2 S.C.R. 561,96 D.L.R. (3d) 14 at 32 (S.C.C.).
201. In Mills, supra note 190 at 217, Justice Lamer noted that protection of the societal
interest in the prompt prosecution of criminal cases, and hence public confidence in the
criminal justice system, was a bi-product of the accused's right to be tried within a reasonable
time. See also ibid, cited in Kodellas, supra note 188 at 176-77.
202. An example is provided in Shreve, supra note 192 at D/374, where a Board of Inquiry
did stay proceedings because delay aggravated the effect of other procedural irregularities. The
adjudicator commented:
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There are two other ways, more subtle than simply granting a stay on
grounds of delay alone, to signal the need for agency reform where
administrative slowness is a problem. The first arises in situations where
delay is only one of several factors that interact to create an abuse of
process. In these circumstances, the unique combination of grounds
means that a stay can be granted without it becoming a generalizable
precedent that risks bringing agency work to a halt.
Several examples can be cited. In Commercial Union, the Human
Rights Commission's failure to give the respondent an opportunity to be
heard prior to taking a reconsideration decision, -the Commission's
knowledge of without prejudice settlement proposals, and the death of a
key witness during an "inordinate delay," combined to create prejudice.
That decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal:
However, having regard to the delay and resulting prejudice and to the
admitted procedural unfairness of the first reconsideration, the respondent
has good reason to fear that a fair decision cannot be arrived at by the same
body and that a second reconsideration will inevitably result in unfairness,
in the circumstances. 20 3
In Shreve, a board of inquiry used the interactive effect of several errors
to justify a stay. It held that unreasonable delay and the bias of the
investigating officer did not, on their own, sufficiently prejudice the
respondent, but their combined effect was to make inadequate disclosure
incurable, and so fatal.2 4
In several professional discipline cases a series of procedural errors,
including delay, "taken together" added up to substantial prejudice. In
Misra,20 5 reasonable apprehension of bias was created when a medical
college registrar dictated a motion suspending a doctor before the
I think the combination of circumstances in this case carries the prejudice to the
Respondents beyond the point of tolerance. The only consolation I can offer to the
Complainant is that a decision such as this may have some effect in reforming the
process of the Commission to the benefit of Complainants, as well as Respon-
dents. While the Frawley affidavit indicates the Commission is already taking
significant steps in the direction of such reform, there is no assurance that this
reform will endure. A legal ruling demonstrating that the Commission's processes
can actually defeat the objective of securing compliance with the Code should
reinforce the impetus to reform.
203. Supra note 197 at 114. A similar decision was reached in Ministry of Health, supra note
194 where the Ontario Divisional Court followed Commercial Union. Human Rights proceed-
ings in Ministry of Health were stayed because of the Commission's failure to follow statutory
procedural requirements in making a reconsideration decision (especially in not giving the
respondent notice) and because of a seven to nine year delay.
204. Shreve, supra note 192 at D/374. The reasoning is somewhat circuitous. If delay makes
the necessary disclosure impossible, then delay has prejudiced the respondent's ability to
defend.
205. Supra note 196.
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discipline hearing had taken place. This, plus long delay, made it
oppressive and unfair to pursue the charges. In Lang v. Ramsay,20 6 the
improper application of the required standard of proof by a police
misconduct hearing, plus a five-and-a-half year delay, resulted in a
holding of misconduct being quashed.
Second, courts on applications relating to delay, and boards on similar
motions, frequently dismiss the applications or motions but take the
opportunity to admonish the agencies concerned if they have reputations
for delay and mismanagement. While not as draconian as stays, these
written tongue-lashings by an impartial authority-the equivalent of an
unfavorable external performance review -send a signal to the agencies
concerned and to those to whom they are accountable. Because respon-
dents' delay applications are dismissed, the rebukes do not stop com-
plaints from being adjudicated.
Courts have chosen the following words of admonition: "inordinate
delay;"2 °7 "extraordinary and unacceptable;"208 and "appalling and inex-
cusable."2 09 In A & P, Justice Carruthers made the following comment
about the Human Rights Commission bureaucracy: 21 0
For some years now, this court has found it necessary, on occasion, to
express its concern for the extent of the delay involved in proceedings
under the Code. This concern is apparently shared with others. In its
reasons for its First Interim Decision, the Board states, "The cumbersome
delays attendant upon human rights investigative process are a matter of
public record." The material contains a copy of the presentation which the
then Chief Commissioner of the Commission made to the Ontario Human
Rights Code Task Force on April 30, 1992. It contains the following:
The present complaint process under the code is structured in such
a way as to inevitably create delay .... What is needed is a
fundamentally different process ....
In the present case, the delay is inordinate and borders on the inexcusable.
Nearly eight years have gone by without a resolution of the issues raised
in the Gale Complaint, and it may be some time yet before this might
happen.
206. (1992), 11 O.R. (3d) 190 at 201,96 D.L.R. (4th) 594 (Div. Ct.).
207. Commercial Union, supra note 197 (two-and-a-half years).
208. Motorways Direct Transport Ltd. v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission)
(1991), 43 F.T.R. 211,50 Admin. L.R. 222 (four years).
209. Brock University v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (1996), 36 Admin L.R. (2d)
267,91 O.A.C. 71 (Div. Ct.) leave to appeal to C.A. refused (1996), 36 Admin. L.R. (2d) 267n
(Ont. C.A.) (nine years).
210. Supra note 130 at 832. The delay argument was rejected as premature but the application
was successful on bias grounds.
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Ontario Human Rights Boards of Inquiry, perhaps because of their
reluctance to sanction delays by granting stays, have been very vocal in
disapproving Commission tardiness, particularly when unexplained.
They have used the following adjectives: "undue delay;"' "most regret-
table; ' "egregious; ' "excessively long;"'2 14 "very concerned that a
period of four years transpires before the hearing of the complaint;" 215
and "regrettable. 2 6 These words are not meant to be gratuitous. The
Board in Simms added the following comment:
Having dismissed the motion to dismiss for reason of delay, I mention as
an aside that I have considerable sympathy for both the respondents and the
complainant in having to suffer with any system that takes seven years to
get a legal dispute resolved by a tribunal of first instance. It should be
possible to develop a dispute resolution mechanism that could at minimal
cost make binding determinations on human rights issues expeditiously,
while reserving the right of appeal for a hearing de novo where contentious
issues remain or important points of law need to be determined.217
The words of admonition may have had an effect. Both the Canadian
Human Rights Commission, and its Ontario counterpart, have recently
reported efficiency gains. The former indicates that in 1993-94 it took 21
months to get a case through the system; by 1997 that figure was down
to 9 months. Ontario reports that by 1997 only 150 complaints, out of a
total caseload of 2,900, were 3 years old, a number down considerably
from 1993. More sobering, the average case in the Ontario system still
takes 15 to 17 months.218
There is concern that the limited use of the stay, or the overuse of the
rebuke, makes these sanctions hollow and easily ignored. The need to
provide an effective judicial check to ensure agency efficiency, and so to
211. Morin v. Noranda Inc. (1988), 9 C.H.R.R. D/5245 (Ont. Bd. of Inquiry) (nearly three
years).
212. Ghosh v. Douglas Inc. (1991), 16 C.H.R.R. D/16 (Ont. Bd. of Inquiry) (five years).
213. Coubrough v. Brantford (City) Commissioners of Police (1992), 19 C.H.R.R. D/386
(Ont. Bd. of Inquiry) (six years).
214. Shreve, supra note 192 (six years).
215. Daccash v. Richards (1992), 20 C.H.R.R. D/208 (Ont. Bd. of Inquiry); also Baptiste v.
Napanee & District Rod & Gun Club (1993), 19 C.H.R.R. D/246 (Ont. Bd. of Inquiry) (five
years).
216. Simms v. Seetech Metal Products (1993), 20 C.H.R.R. D/477 (Ont. Bd. of Inquiry)
(seven years).
217. Supra note 187 at D/481 [italics in original].
218. J. Hampton, "OHRC sees light at the end of its backlog tunnel" The Lawyers Weekly (10
January 1997) 7, 12.
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maintain public confidence in the administrative system, is real. Where
more measured sanctions are not being taken seriously, the more power-
ful shock of a stay may be necessary to end unreasonable delay. In the
past, especially in human rights cases, stays may have been underutilized,
with the resultant unchecked damage to the reputation of the agencies
concerned.
Conclusion
Agency reputation and judicial review are connected under the rubric of
expertise, bias and delay. Where agency reputation is strong, courts will
be disinclined to intervene. Deference will be accorded when an agency
is expert, i.e., when the public is confident that the agency is qualified to
do its job; when an agency raises no reasonable apprehension of bias, i.e.,
when the public is confident that the agency will not use public power to
further private interests; and, when an agency discharges its responsibili-
ties without prejudicial delay, i.e., when the public is confident that the
agency is being managed efficiently.
The possibility of reputational review has several implications for the
actors concerned. Unless it is to be reduced to a matter of impression,
courts are going to have to develop a more systematic approach when
considering reputational grounds. Measures of agency capability, and
performance appraisal, are going to have to be articulated and applied;
objective criteria for determining the appropriate degree of impartiality,
and performance codes governing adjudicative conduct, are going to
have to be elaborated; realistic and consistent time frames for dealing
with the effect of delay on memory will have to be adopted. Lawyers
bringing review applications on reputational grounds will have to lead
evidence to assist courts with the increased scope of their inquiry.
Reputational review should be neither ad hoc review, nor a beauty
contest.
Administrative agencies that wish to avoid judicial interference would
do well to tend to their reputation. At its worst, this could become a
popularity contest with agencies retaining public relations firms in order
to manipulate public opinion on their behalf. But puffery need not defeat
substance. At its best, the care of reputation would see agencies becoming
more democratically responsive to public views about the way in which
public business is to be conducted.
This article does not claim that reputation is the only unarticulated
variable that may influence the degree of judicial deference shown an
administrative agency. Deference may be shown for no other reason than
that the subject matter in question is complex, technical and daunting.
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Energy regulation comes to mind. Judicial intervention may occur more
frequently simply because the subject matter in question is politically
interesting or juridically familiar. Human rights matters, especially those
closely related to Charter issues, suggest themselves. Judges may harbour
a natural sympathy for certain kinds of complaints, instinctive antipathy
for some respondents and may identify with some adjudicators more than
others. Criminal injury compensation complaints, stock promoters ac-
cused of regulatory offences, and law society discipline committees
provide some possible examples. A judge's own sympathies-a kind of
personal assessment of reputation-may be a factor where a judge is
familiar from past experience with how the agency works. If these kinds
of considerations are influencing judges' thinking on judicial review,
they deserve to be brought out from behind the judicial rhetoric of
jurisdiction and given a proper legal basis, or discredited. That would
enable all players in administrative adjudication to know where they
stand and to govern their actions accordingly.
Legal doctrine may make a link between reputation and deference
theoretically possible; it will take empirical research to confirm that such
a link actually exists. A necessary first step is to demonstrate that
administrative agencies have in fact a public reputation, a public profile.
This task will be attempted in an article to follow. Through print media
content analysis, that article will show that it is possible to measure the
public esteem in which administrators are held.
